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Courts are willing, in commercial contexts, to enforce promises
even without consideration when enforcement supports a norm of
reciprocity-a norm which recognizes that promises are seldom
totally gratuitous, but are often made in furtherance of reciprocal,
long-term, trust-based relationships. In this article, Professor
Leslie argues that relational contract principles are firmly
embedded in wills law. Courts enforce the reciprocity norm in the
family context just as they do in commercial contexts; this
enforcement is seen, however, not in breach of promise suits,
which occur rarely between family members, but rather in will
contests. Despite the prevalent ideology of wills law, in which the
testator's intent is paramount, Professor Leslie argues that courts
bend doctrinal rules to validate wills that comply with the
reciprocity norm and to invalidate those that do not. Finally,
Professor Leslie examines whether courts are justified in
implicitly reinforcing the norm. She concludes that implicit
enforcement rewards family members who have relied on trust,
while avoiding commodification that might occur at the margins if
the enforcement rule were made explicit.
INTRODUC TON ....................................................................................... 551
I. FALSE DICHOTOMIES: BEQUEST/CONTRACT AND
GIFT/EXCHANGE ......................................................................... 561
A . Bequest v. Contract ............................................................... 561
B. Gift v. Exchange .................................................................... 563
C. Reciprocity in Gift-Giving ................................................... 564
II. RECIPROCITY AND THE FAMILY ............................................... 570
A. Family Relationships: Trust and Reciprocity .................... 571
1. The R ole of Trust ............................................................ 571
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. B.A., University of Oregon, 1983; J.D., Cardozo School of Law, 1991.
The author thanks David Grey Carlson, Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Scott Shapiro,
and Stewart E. Sterk for their helpful comments and suggestions, and Veena Murthy,
Edward Goldstein, and Sandi F. Greene for their helpful research assistance.
552 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77
2. Building Trust Through Reciprocity ............................ 575
3. Whom Do We Trust? ..................................................... 578
4. The Family: The Primary Standardized Long-
Term Relationship .......................................................... 581
B. The Role of Implicit Understandings and Reliance ........... 583
III. RECIPROCITY AND WILLS LAW ................................................. 586
A. Interdependency and the Implied Promise of
Inheritance ............................................................................. 587
B. The Case Law ........................................................................ 590
1. Undue Influence Law ..................................................... 591
2. Form alities ....................................................................... 600
IV. RECIPROCITY AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTRACT
D OCTRINE ..................................................................................... 608
V. Is ENFORCEMENT OF IMPLIED FAMILY
UNDERSTANDINGS JUSTIFIABLE? ............................................. 619
A. An Enforceability Rule Would Not Encourage Trust or
Increase Efficient Outcomes ................................................ 620
B. Enforcing Testators' Implied Promises Would Not
Generate Inefficiencies ......................................................... 622
C. An Enforceability Rule Might Generate Costs at the
M argins .................................................................................. 627
D. The Law's Supportive Function .......................................... 630
E. The Construct of Wills Law Resolves the Tension ............ 634
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 635
INTRODUCTION
In the ideology of American wills law, the testator is a rugged
individualist. He owes no duties to family or friends. He generally is
free to distribute his estate to whomever he pleases, subject only to a
limited duty to his spouse. His motives, whether benevolent or
spiteful, are of no concern. His estate is responsible for his torts and
bound by his express contracts, but any other expectations he may
have fostered during his life are irrelevant. If his will devastates
family members, that is entirely beside the point. Who deserves to
share in his estate is his decision alone to make.' The testator is the
1. See, e.g., Fischer v. Heckerman, 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989)
(emphasizing that "[t]he right of a testator to make a will according to his own wishes is
jealously guarded by courts, regardless of a particular court's view of the justice of the
chosen disposition"); In re Estate of Herz, 651 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that
"a court may not undo the will merely because the testator's desire does not comport with
others' notions of fairness or equity"); In re Will of Smoak, 334 S.E.2d 806, 811 (S.C.
1985) (emphasizing that the" 'right to make a will, is the right to make it according to the
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model of the Marlboro Man: free, unencumbered, independent,
autonomous.
Outside of wills law, legal doctrine has long abandoned (if it ever
fully embraced) the "Marlboro Man" model of the legal person.
Instead, law-in particular, contracts law-treats the individual as a
complex, socially situated person, enmeshed in a number of long-
term, interdependent relationships that both exact costs and bestow
benefits. Autonomy remains important, but an individual's
autonomy is defined, in large measure, by the obligations and
commitments she creates within relationships.'
Modern scholarship increasingly has recognized that promises
are often gestures in furtherance of long-term, interdependent
testator's pleasure--judiciously or capriciously-justly or unjustly-at absolute discretion,
subject only to the restraints upon the power of disposition which the law has imposed'"
(quoting Means v. Means, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 167, 191 (1850))); Daugherty v. Daugherty,
784 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. 1990) (noting that "[i]t is the absolute right of the testator to
direct the disposition of his property and the Court's [sic] are limited to the ascertainment
and enforcement of his directions"); In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash.
1998) (noting that "[a] basic principle underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that
an individual has the right and the freedom to dispose of his or her property, upon death,
according to the dictates of his or her own desires" (citing In re Estate of Hastings, 567
P.2d 200 (Wash. 1977))).
Most scholars agree that giving effect to testamentary intent is the primary objective
of wills law. See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) (stating that "[o]ne fundamental
proposition is that, under a legal system of recognizing the individualistic institution of
private property and granting to the owner the power to determine his successors in
ownership, the general philosophy of courts should favor giving effect to an intentional
exercise of that power"); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of
Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 CoLUM. L. REV.
1, 3 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors] (stating that "[t]he Wills
Act is meant to assure- the implementation of [the testator's] testamentary intent at a time
when he can no longer express himself by other means"); John H. Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein,
Substantial Compliance] (stating that "virtually the entire law of wills derives from the
premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in
life"); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV.
541, 546 (1990) (arguing that attestation requirements should be abolished because "[t]he
law should set requirements at a level that tends to enforce the testator's intent, not
frustrate it"); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills
Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 39 (1985) (criticizing courts for invalidating
defectively executed wills "even when no one questions that the will represents the wishes
and intent of the testator"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 33.1 cmts. d, g (1992) (emphasizing that a policy objective of
the Restatement is better effectuation of a testator's intent; noting that law reform
organizations, some legislatures, and commentators support use of the harmless error
rule; and recommending use of the substantial compliance doctrine to effectuate better
the testator's intent).
2. See infra Part IV.
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relationships. Even when promises are not made as part of an
express bargain, they are seldom purely gratuitous.' The promisor
may reap value from the promise in two senses. First, she may
benefit from the promisee's reaction to a specific promise, even when
that reaction does not fit the classical definition of detrimental
reliance.5  Second, she may derive future benefits because the
promise may instigate or strengthen a long-term relationship.6
When parties have an ongoing relationship, casual statements or
actions alone may amount to enforceable promises. When the
norms of the relationship, considered against the backdrop of the
larger subculture in which the relationship operates,8 suggest that the
3. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
CAL. L. REV. 821, 844-46 (1997) (noting that promises within "affective" relationships
serve to strengthen and define the relationship itself); Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52
U. CHi. L. REV. 903, 914-29 (1985) (discussing the role promises play in long-term,
interdependent, trust-based commercial relationships); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981) (noting that
"[p]arties frequently enter into continuing, highly interactive contractual arrangements"
that "diverge so markedly from the classical model [of contract] that they require
separate treatment"); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIs. L.
REV. 465, 467-68 (noting that "[e]ven discrete transactions take place within a setting of
continuing relationships and interdependence"); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 487 (observing that "discrete
exchanges are always relatively rare compared to patterns of relational exchange"); Eric
A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997
Wis. L. REv. 567, 603-06 (observing that many promises are made to initiate or further
trust-based relationships); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 235 (1979) (noting that many
contractual relations are not described by the classic "discrete-transaction paradigm").
For an extended exploration and economic critique of courts' approach to relational
contract cases, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 190-98
(1989); Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 925-29; Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading,
Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly)
Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295,295-308 (1992).
5. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 928-29 (suggesting, for example, that an
employer might promise to extend a benefit in order to increase employee morale and
decrease the employee turnover rate); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises,
21 J. LEGAL STuD. 39,59-64 (1992).
6. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 924-29; see also Macaulay, supra note 3,
at 467 (noting that business people "perform disadvantageous contracts today because
often this gains credit that they can draw on in the future").
7. See, e.g., D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1434, 1444-45
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (finding that heavily conditioned, oral statements amounted to an
enforceable promise); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, N.A., 306 N.C. 417, 429,
293 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1982) (holding that prior conduct amounted to an implied promise to
waive a writing requirement for a tenant's renewal of a lease).
8. See, e.g., D & G Stout, Inc., 805 F. Supp. at 1451 (emphasizing that the promisee
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parties intended to create an obligation, courts often impose liability
even when the promisee cannot establish actual, detrimental
reliance.9 Often, courts accomplish this result by stretching the
doctrines of promissory estoppel or consideration to fit their holdings
within the structure of classical contract doctrine. 10
Thus, contracts law and scholarship have progressed steadily
toward a view of the individual as grounded in a context-
specifically, the context of relationships. Increasingly in contracts
law, courts take relationships seriously. When a promisor's
statements or actions benefit the promisor, the promisor bears
responsibility for the effects that her statements or actions have on
other parties with whom the promisor has an ongoing relationship.
She cannot simply change her mind when change proves convenient.
Notwithstanding relational contract theory, commentators who
argue that courts generally enforce "gratuitous" promises hesitate
when they consider whether and to what extent courts enforce
gratuitous promises made within personal, especially family,
relationships." This tentativeness may stem from the dearth of cases
reasonably interpreted the promisor's conditional statements as a binding promise given
the "informal" nature of the liquor distribution industry and the industry's general
reliance on trust); see also Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 914-17 (suggesting that
courts determining whether a promise was made pay attention to the context of the
relationship); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 930 (1990) (suggesting that courts should
consider the norms of the relationship). See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACr (1980) (explaining relational contract theory); Ian R. Macneil, The
Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) (same).
9. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 907-15; Kull, supra note 5, at 40-45; see
also Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111
(1991) (arguing that courts enforce gratuitous promises that inspire no reliance under the
rubric of promissory estoppel).
10. See Kull, supra note 5, at 40-45.
11. For example, Daniel Farber and John Matheson argue that, even absent reliance,
courts enforce gratuitous promises made in business contexts. See Farber & Matheson,
supra note 3, at 937-38. They expressly limit their argument to commercial promises,
however, suggesting only that their thesis might support a reexamination of the
traditional nonenforcement approach to gratuitous promises in the family context. See id.
Andrew Kull, who argues that all clearly expressed, seriously intended promises are
enforceable, hints that his argument falters as a descriptive matter when family promises
are at issue, although he cannot explain why. See Kull, supra note 5, at 40 (hypothesizing
that courts may be reluctant to enforce informal family promises because the parties did
not contemplate that the promise would be legally enforceable and noting that courts
occasionally refuse to enforce written promises between family members, but offering no
explanation as to why). Eric Posner acknowledges and appears to justify judicial
enforcement of some gratuitous promises. See Posner, supra note 3, at 606 (noting, and
seeming to endorse, courts' willingness to enforce firm offers and requirement contracts).
He suggests that his analysis of gifts and gratuitous promises applies both in personal and
commercial contexts, but his examples either lack context or concern only business
1999]
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involving intra-familial suits for breach of promise. The sample is too
small to enable one to generalize about how courts treat those
promises. The scarcity of cases involving breach of promise within
intimate relationships reflects two factors: the often indefinite nature
of personal agreements and the unwillingness of parties to sue until
the relationship is beyond repair.
Even if one family member wanted to sue another for breach of
promise, it would be hard to isolate particular promises and acts of
reliance within the relationship. Very few cases would display the
easy clarity of the rare, but often cited, war horses like Hamer v.
Sidway, 2 in which a nephew sued his uncle for breaching an express
promise to pay the nephew if he forswore drinking and swearing. 13
Agreements within long-term, intimate relationships are most often
implicit and multifaceted. The relationships themselves are premised
on reciprocity, constructed of a multitude of mutual and
simultaneous promises and actions generated, at least in part, by
reliance on those promises. The closer and more interdependent the
parties, the less likely promises and agreements will be isolated and
clearly spelled out, 4 because the parties operate in accordance with
implied understandings, and because the value generated by those
implied understandings is greatly enhanced if the reciprocal nature of
the duties within the relationship is left unspoken. 5 The relationship
simply cannot be diagrammed as a series of discrete transactions that
fit neatly into the classical contract paradigm of bargained-for
exchange, nor should it be.
Of course, indefiniteness alone is not an adequate explanation
relationships. See id. at 603 (discussing relationships between a university and a faculty
member and between law firms and summer associates); id. at 604 (considering a
relationship between a faculty member and a university).
12. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
13. As Andrew Kull points out, even these classic types of "gratuitous" promises are
generally enforced. See Kull, supra note 5, at 42-43.
14. Hegel stated that "the precise nature of marriage is to begin from the point of
view of contract-i.e.[,j that of individual personality as a self-sufficient unit-in order to
supersede it." G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 203 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); cf Farber & Matheson,
supra note 3, at 925 (discussing informal arrangements in commercial contexts); Goetz &
Scott, supra note 3, at 1091 (describing a relational contract as one in which "the parties
are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations," which would be "impracticable because of inability to identify uncertain
future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately
even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance").
15. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 847-49 (arguing that enforcement of gratuitous
promises within personal relationships would commodify the relationship and devalue the
performance of the promise).
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for family members' reluctance to resort to legal process. After all,
courts have become increasingly willing to enforce indefinite
agreements in the commercial context.'6 More importantly, family
members do not look to the law because doing so would destroy the
familial relationship. Personal interdependent relationships are most
often characterized by a high degree of trust. When trust
disintegrates, it does so slowly, and disappointed parties generally
harbor hopes that a disintegrating relationship will improve. In
family relationships especially, strong psychological ties often inspire
the promisee to hope for reconciliation. Moreover, the promisee
would prefer that the promisor's performance be voluntary rather
than coerced; the performance is valuable, in large measure, because
it is motivated, or appears to be motivated, by love rather than self-
interest. The disappointed promisee will abandon hope only when
the relationship clearly is beyond repair, and the promisee is
sufficiently angered by the promisor's betrayal that she is willing to
sever the relationship entirely. Short of that, there will be no lawsuit
because the promisee knows that a suit would quickly and finally
destroy whatever trust is left. Often, family relationships end only at
divorce or death.' 7
When a family member dies, the decedent's will becomes
critical. If the will prefers the testator's closest family members,
those relatives will have little reason to seek enforcement of lifetime
obligations left outstanding. On the other hand, if the will disinherits
one of the testator's closest family members, that relative may
interpret disinheritance as a final breach of the decedent's implied
agreement to reciprocate for support and care furnished during
decedent's lifetime. Social norms reinforce the idea that family
members who are caring and supportive can expect and rely upon an
inheritance; the vast majority of testators do in fact devise their
estates to their closest family members.'" Only when a family
relationship has seriously deteriorated do most testators disinherit
these family members.19
16. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 606 (noting courts' increased willingness to
enforce certain types of "vague" promises).
17. Indeed, Kull notes that a defining characteristic of the non-commercial gratuitous
promise cases that he studied is that all but one involved a lawsuit brought against the
estate of the promisor. See Kull, supra note 5, at 44-46.
18. See JEFFREY P. ROSENFELD, THE LEGACY OF AGING: INHERITANCE AND
DISINHERrrANCE IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 91-93 (1979); MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL.,
THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 118-20 (1970).
19. See ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 91-93; SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 118-
1999]
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A family member who feels wrongly disinherited has two options
at the testator's death: He can file a creditor's claim for breach of an
implied agreement (although it is not clear whether such a claim
would be successful), or he can contest the will. The family member
is unlikely to file a creditor's claim for several reasons. Most
obviously, our culture views family relationships as based on love and
altruism, not self-interest. Filing a creditor's claim requires the
family member to "tote up" what he provided to the testator and ask
for "compensation." He must commodify acts that were, at least in
part, performed out of love. He thus cheapens the relationship,
reveals self-interested motives, and risks that others will judge him
greedy or ungrateful. Moreover, a breach of promise claim highlights
the testator's rejection of the aggrieved family member. It is a stark
admission that the testator did not appreciate the claimant as much
as the claimant had hoped. Finally, even a successful claimant
receives cold comfort-he receives payment, but he knows that the
decedent did not provide it voluntarily.
The same family member faces no such concerns if he simply
contests the decedent's will. In a will contest, the family member is
ostensibly acting on behalf of the testator. If he contests the will for
failure to comply with formalities, he argues that the proffered
document does not represent the final, deliberate intent of the
testator. Similarly, a challenge on the grounds of lack of capacity or
undue influence allows the contestant to argue for the disposition
that the testator would have made had she been able to freely express
her intentions. After a successful contest, the family member can
believe that he has effectuated the testator's true intent. Thus, the
will contest often is the perfect vehicle for assuaging disappointed
expectations while upholding the value of the completed gift.
As a result, wills law provides a wealth of information-perhaps
far more than contracts law-regarding how courts approach
promises within personal relationships. After all, wills law pits the
testator's closest relatives against one another, or against a non-
relative will beneficiary with whom the testator had a relationship.
This Article argues that relational contract principles are firmly
embedded in wills law. Specifically, courts and juries resolving will
contests approach those cases in much the same way that modern
courts approach contracts cases. They take into account the quality
of the testator-contestant relationship and larger social norms.20 If
20. Cf Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 914-17 (describing how courts take these
factors into account in contracts cases); Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel
[Vol. 77
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the contestant appears to have been actively involved in the testator's
life, the fact-finder is apt to set aside the will to enable the contestant
to receive a share of the testator's estate. This outcome reflects the
fact-finder's understanding that families operate in accordance with
implicit understandings. Courts do not expect families to articulate
those understandings expressly because the bargaining process would
devalue relationships. On the other hand, if the contestant was
generally unavailable to meet the testator's needs, both the dynamics
of the relationship and larger cultural norms indicate that the testator
is not guilty of breach of an implied promise. In that case, the court
admits the will to probate.2'
The role that reciprocity plays in wills law is obscured by the
prevalent ideology of donative transfers, including testamentary
ones, as unilateral transactions. 2   Once a donative transfer is
conceptualized as unilateral-the donor is giving away her
property-it naturally follows that the court should simply ensure
that the gift is validly made, determine its terms, and give it effect.
This description precludes considering whether a testamentary
transfer is in satisfaction or in breach of a previously made promise.
Consequently, successful will contests are rationalized as upholding
testator's intent or dismissed as wrongly decided. Further obscuring
the key role that family reciprocity plays in wills law is the fact that
most testators act in accordance with the reciprocity norm and leave
the bulk of their estates to their closest family members. In reality,
then, most cases that validate wills are over-determined: Courts
justify their decisions as effectuating testamentary intent, but the
family reciprocity norm provides an alternative basis for the same
result. Because the role of the family reciprocity norm is obscured,
neither courts nor commentators have examined it as a justification
for denying effect to the testator's will.23
This Article undertakes that examination. Part I illustrates the
Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 309 (1992) (arguing that "[iln neoclassical [contract]
law, liability can arise from something less than an explicit assumption of it and it may be
shaped by background assumptions, such as trade usage and the relational liabilities
imposed on certain types of activity").
21. See infra Part III.A., for a discussion of why courts might presume that a non-
relative will beneficiary has a weaker claim on testator's assets than the family member-
contestant.
22. See, e.g., supra note I (citing cases and commentary).
23. Eric Posner has recognized that family members cannot protect themselves by
reducing understandings to express contract and notes that courts in other countries often
invalidate wills disinheriting family. He suggests that such wills violate a "long-term
contract between the donor and his family for support." Posner, supra note 3, at 596.
Posner seems to assume that this phenomenon does not exist in U.S. wills law.
1999]
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illusory nature of the gift/exchange dichotomy. Part II develops that
theme, showing how long-term, interdependent relationships are
characterized by a norm of delayed, though mandatory, reciprocity.
Part II then establishes that the reciprocity norm is especially strong
in the family setting and that family members view intra-familial
inheritance as a final act of reciprocity in an intimate, trust-based
relationship. This understanding regarding the entitlement to an
inheritance is so strong as to amount to an implied promise that will
be broken only when the expectant beneficiary has himself failed to
honor the reciprocity norm. Part III argues that courts understand
and apply these normative concepts to will contests, stretching to
validate wills that comply with the reciprocity norm and to reject
wills that violate it. In doing so, courts implicitly give effect to
implied promises in the family context. Part IV argues that will
contest decisions mirror the approach courts take to contract disputes
involving implied promises made within long-term, trust-based
relationships.
Finally, in Part V, I address the obvious question: Are courts
justified in enforcing implied understandings in the family context?
In exploring that issue, I address recent scholarship discussing the
enforceability of gratuitous promises. 24 I argue that, as applied to the
question of implicit family promises, the arguments of these
commentators share a common flaw-they fail to appreciate the role
of trust within personal relationships. Instead, they assume that
when family members and close friends act towards one another they
consider, at least subconsciously, the applicable legal rules. I argue
that family members rarely consider the legal rules when evaluating
the motives of loved ones or determining whether to rely on them for
support. Rather, an assessment of trustworthiness and an awareness
of cultural norms inform those decisions. Only when trust is lacking
and self-interest substantially dominates altruism will family
members worry about the legal enforceability of family obligations.
The legal rule, therefore, is likely to influence behavior only at
the margins. A rule expressly enforcing implied family
understandings might, at the margins, cheapen relationships by
encouraging commodification. Courts deciding will contests avoid
this problem by cloaking their decisions in the garb of traditional
intent-effectuating doctrines and de-emphasizing the importance of
the reciprocity norm.
24. In particular, I examine the recent work of Goetz and Scott, Farber and
Matheson, Eric Posner, and Eisenberg. See infra Parts V.A. & V.B.
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I. FALSE DICHOTOMIES: BEQUEST/CONTRACT AND
GIFT/EXCHANGE
A. Bequest v. Contract
Legal doctrine segregates contracts from wills, insisting on two
rigid, air-tight categories that do not overlap. While A is alive,
contracts law determines whether her voluntary words and acts
create enforceable obligations.25 A court might ask a variety of
questions about a particular transaction between A and B: Was there
a clear agreement? Was there consideration?26 If not, did A, by her
words and actions, induce reliance by B?27 Given the context, should
A have foreseen that B would rely?' Was B's reliance reasonable?29
Even if B's reliance was unreasonable, did B nevertheless confer
some benefit on A for which B deserves to be reimbursed?" In short,
the court considers what rights and liabilities arise from both parties'
words and actions within the context of the parties' relationship.
Compare that process to the one contemplated by the statute of
wills. Suppose A's will leaves nothing to her daughter, C, who feels
entitled to a portion of her mother's estate and contests the will. In
resolving the dispute, the court might consider a variety of issues that
have at their core one question: What did A intend, as evidenced by
the document purporting to be her will? According to popular lore,
the relationship between A and C during A's life is, for the most part,
irrelevant. The only relevant inquiries must concern A's state of
mind: Did A intend this document to be her will?31 What did A
intend to communicate by her choice of certain words? 32 And finally,
does A's intended plan violate some well-established policy, such as
the rule against perpetuities?33 If all or part of A's will is invalid, C
might take by default as an intestate heir, but not because a
determination was made that the relationship between A and C gave
rise to an obligation on A's part to make a bequest to C.
Thus, the focus in the contract case is on the relationship
25. Of course, the law of tort also plays a role, but a discussion of tort law is beyond
the scope of this Article.
26. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
27. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
28. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
29. See, e.g., State Bank v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
30. See, e.g., Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983).
31. See, e.g., In re Estate of Smith, 862 P.2d 509 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Draper v.
Pauley, 480 S.E.2d 495 (Va. 1997).
32. See, e.g., In re Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 547 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 1989).
33. See, e.g., Cook v. Horn, 104 S.E.2d 461 (Ga. 1958).
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between two or more parties, while the focus in the will case is on the
intent of a single individual. The result is a dramatic difference in the
way B and C are forced to characterize their legal claims. Because
the relationship between A and B is the seed from which contractual
liability flows, B can argue that certain words or actions of A, or their
absence, gave rise to liability, despite the absence of an express
agreement. The law provides B with several ways to characterize his
claim: breach of an implied contract, unjust enrichment, promissory
estoppel, quantum meruit.
C will have a more difficult time making a comparable claim
against A's estate. As a threshold matter, a court generally assumes
that A had the right to dispose of her property as she saw fit and that
only A's will can determine whether and to what extent C is entitled
to a portion of A's property. 4 Thus, C must use entirely different
concepts to articulate a claim; her approach must focus on whether A
actually formulated and properly expressed her intentions.
Of course, C is not precluded from making a contract claim
against A's estate, provided she can produce a valid written contract
that complies with the statute of frauds or convince the court to
exercise equitable powers to give effect to a clear oral promise to
devise. A few courts have recognized claims against an estate
involving quantum meruit or reliance,5 but heirs rarely advance
those claims.36 In the main, legal doctrine assumes that A was in the
best position to determine whether and to what extent C deserved a
distribution and that A's valid will is dispositive evidence of her
decision.37 Thus, if A made an express, gratuitous promise to devise
her estate to C, C generally has no cognizable claim if A fails to
perform. Whatever A may have promised during her life, whatever
reliance A might have induced or benefits she may have incurred,
and whatever disappointment her will might engender is supposedly
34. There are, of course, certain statutory exceptions that curtail free testation, such
as the elective share and pretermitted child statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.1-A, 5-3.2 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1998).
35. See, e.g., Slawsby v. Slawsby, 601 N.E.2d 478,479 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (granting
the son of the decedent the value of his services for relying on oral promises made by the
decedent that the son would inherit one-eighth of his father's real estate company only if
the son worked and stayed with his father's supermarket business); In re Estate of Bush,
908 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (granting the brother-in-law of the decedent,
who died testate, quantum meruit relief as compensation for care he provided the
decedent for the last three years of his life).
36. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1306 (1980); see also supra text following note
19 (detailing reasons why heirs rarely advance contract claims against an estate).
37. See supra note 1 (citing cases).
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of no concern to the probate court.38
B. Gift v. Exchange
The unidimensional approach of wills law stems from the
threshold characterization of a testamentary transfer as a gift rather
than an exchange.39  Gratuitous promises are unilateral and,
according to conventional lore, unenforceable. The well-accepted
general rule-that most gratuitous promises are unenforceable-has
been justified on various grounds, most notably that the costs of
enforcement would far exceed the value that gratuitous promises
create.40
As Jane Baron, Carol Rose, and others have suggested, the rigid
distinction between gift and exchange is misguided.41 Baron notes
that the distinction is a twentieth-century construct that was a drastic
departure from established common-law principles and a distinction
at odds with the way most cultures, past and present, conceptualize
gifts. 42  Rose demonstrates that gift and exchange exist on a
continuum, and each usually contains an element of the other.43
Thus, a gratuitous promise ripens into an enforceable obligation
when it motivates reasonable reliance, even though the parties did
not agree upon an exchange at the outset. Further down the
spectrum towards "gift," we find elements of exchange: Even
gratuitous promises that do not induce reliance are seldom motivated
by "sheer niceness." 44 It is the rare gift that does not contain some
element of exchange. If it does not, Rose wryly argues, we are more
38. One justification for this dichotomy might be that A's moral obligations
evaporate at A's death-how can a deceased person still "owe" a duty to another? But
that view is inconsistent with the way wills law generally views the decedent. A
substantial body of doctrine is devoted to the project of determining A's intent and
carrying out her wishes, even though she is dead and would not be damaged if her wishes
were frustrated. The law creates an obligation to honor the deceased by continuing to act
as though she is alive.
39. See Baron, supra note 4, at 190-91. Jane Baron establishes that the rigid
gift/exchange distinction is a phenomenon of the early twentieth century. Specifically,
Baron notes that nineteenth century commentators emphasized the similarities, rather
than the differences, between gift and exchange, and that some viewed gifts as a subset of
contracts, rather than as a separate type of transfer. See id.
40. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1304-05; Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,414-17 (1977).
41. See Baron, supra note 4, at 190-98; Rose, supra note 4, at 296-98.
42. See Baron, supra note 4, at 190-98.
43. See Rose, supra note 4, at 296 (stating that "the unilateral aspects of gift transfers
blur into the reciprocal aspects of exchange transfers, and vice versa").
44. See id. at 298.
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inclined to label the transfer "larceny";45 people do not generally
make a transfer unless they experience some benefit. The act of
giving might be a step toward forming a new relationship or
strengthening an established one, or the act might simply confer a
boost to the self-image or an increased sense of well-being.46 The
same could be said for promises to make a future gift.
C. Reciprocity in Gift-Giving
Scholars in other fields who have studied gift-giving view
reciprocity as an essential component of the practice. As Jane Baron
has observed, anthropologists agree that a dominant form of
exchange in primitive cultures was a system of reciprocal transactions
that were conceptualized as "gifts."'47 A fundamental, though
unexpressed, aspect of this system was its obligatory nature. Marcel
Mauss defines the essential features of the gift transaction as: (1) an
obligation to give; (2) the obligation to receive; and (3) the obligation
to reciprocate for a gift given." While gift transactions furthered the
45. See id. at 297. To elaborate, even transfers that might appear on their face to be
purely gratuitous often involve elements of exchange. For example, I might have mixed
motives for sending a wedding gift: I may be motivated in part by a feeling of affection,
and in part by a desire to reciprocate for the wedding gift the bride-to-be sent to me on
the occasion of my own wedding. Both motives have reciprocal elements; if the recipient
is a friend, the gift recognizes reciprocal affection. If she is a business associate, the gift is
in appreciation for the benefits gained from our relationship to date and in furtherance of
the relationship in the future.
46. See id. at 313-16; see also Baron, supra note 4, at 196-98 (establishing that giving
establishes emotional relationships); id. at 172-75 (discussing studies of kidney donors
establishing that donors' "happiness and self-esteem" rise after donation).
47. See Baron, supra note 4, at 194-98. Arjun Appadurai wrote that "[m]any essays
in this volume, as well as my own argument here, are designed to show" that the contrast
between gift and exchange of commodities is a "simplified and overdrawn series of
contrasts[,J" and when dealing with specific examples such as the Melanesian kula, wrote
that these examples "showol us the difficulty of separating gift and commodity exchange
even in preindustrial, nonmonetary systems, and [they] remind[] us of the dangers in
correlating zones of social intimacy too rigidly with distinct forms of exchange." Arjun
Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 12, 22 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
1986); see also CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 52-
68 (Rodney Needham ed. & John Richard von Sturmer trans., Beacon Press 1969)
(establishing that reciprocity in gift-giving was mandatory in primitive cultures);
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC 167 (1922) (stating
in his conclusion that among Trobriand Islanders, reciprocal giving is "one of the main
instruments of social organisation, of the power of the chief, of the bonds of kinship and
of relationship in law"); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR
EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (establishing
that reciprocity in gift-giving was mandatory in primitive cultures).
48. See MAUSS, supra note 47, at 13-14; see also LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 54
(quoting Edward William Nelson, The Eskimo About Bering Strait, in EIGHTEENTH
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economic interests of individuals and groups, they also facilitated
personal and inter-group relationships,4 9 determined status,5 0 and
symbolized spiritual concepts."' Thus, gift exchange was "what
[Mauss] aptly calls 'a total social fact,' that is, an event which has a
significance that is at once social and religious, magic and economic,
utilitarian and sentimental, jural and moral."52
A key feature of the gift transaction was the denial of self-
interested motives. Although individual motives were a complex and
varying mixture of generosity and self-interest (with self-interest
often predominating), the social behavior accompanying the gift
transaction created the illusion of pure generosity and altruism.5 3
"Gifts" were never the subject of bargain.5 4 The norm of delayed
reciprocity, which discouraged an immediate exchange for the gift
given, obscured the mandatory nature of obligation to return the gift
and facilitated the notion that generosity rather than self-interest
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY TO THE SECRETARY OF
THE SMrrHsONIAN INSTITUTION, 1896-1897, pt. 1, at 3, 309 (describing a typical gift
transaction containing all three elements)).
49. See LEvI-STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 55.
50. See D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among
the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 54 (1986).
51. See MAUSS, supra note 47, at 10-13.
52. LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 52. The relative importance of the various
functions performed by the gift economy is a matter of some dispute. For example, Levi-
Strauss notes that the "assumption is found everywhere that reciprocal gifts ... are not
offered principally or essentially with the idea of receiving a profit or advantage of an
economic nature." Id. at 53. Often, there was no increase in wealth as a result of the
exchange; neither party was better off than they were before. See id. Similarly, Mauss
emphasizes that the objects of exchange were
not solely property and wealth,... and things economically useful. In particular,
such exchanges [were] acts of politeness: banquets, rituals, military services,
women, children, dances, festivals, and fairs, in which economic transaction is
only one element, and in which the passing on of wealth is only one feature of a
much more general and enduring contract.
MAUSS, supra note 47, at 5.
David Bruce Johnsen, on the other hand, insists that the economic function was
predominant, and that the other functions evolved to enforce compliance with the
reciprocity norm and thereby discourage free-riding. See Johnsen, supra note 50, at 62-63.
Specifically, Johnsen argues that the purpose of the potlatch of the Southern Kwakiutl
Indians-an elaborate festival where goods and services of all kinds were exchanged, see,
e.g., id. at 53-55-was to establish and maintain property rights in their principal asset, the
salmon fishery. See id. at 58-61. Johnsen's view is that the potlatch both redistributed
wealth and provided insurance in times of scarcity, thus eliminating the need for warfare
over scarce assets. See id. at 64.
53. Mauss concludes that "the present [is] generously given even when, in the gesture
accompanying the transaction, there is only a polite fiction, formalism, and social deceit,
and when really there is obligation and economic self-interest." MAUSS, supra note 47, at
3.
54. See, e.g., id at 10-11, 33.
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motivated the transaction.55 The submergence of self-interested
motives maximized the value of the functions performed by the gift
transaction. 6
Cultures encouraged individuals to honor the duties to give and
to reciprocate by equating status with generous giving. The more one
gave, the greater his standing. 7 Between groups, the group that
provided the most lavish and frequent feasts established social
dominance over other clans. Conversely, failure to give and
reciprocate for gifts received resulted in social condemnation. 8
According to one theory, this social policing device discouraged free-
riding and stabilized relationships between individuals and groups,
thus promoting further giving in reliance on the understanding that
other individuals and groups would comply with norms. 59
In modem times, institutionalized markets have assumed many
of the economic functions of the primitive gift economies.
Nonetheless, gifts and giving behavior continue to play important
roles in human society.60 For one, certain necessities are more
valuable if they are acquired as gifts rather than through market
exchange.61 In the case of such necessities, it is more important than
55. See, e.g., Paul Bohannan, Some Principles of Exchange and Investment Among the
Tiv, in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY: READINGS IN THEORY AND ANALYSIS 300, 300,
303 (Edward E. LeClair, Jr. & Harold K. Schneider eds., 1968). For the same reason,
Jane Baron has noted, a donee rarely reciprocates by making a precisely equivalent gift.
See Baron, supra note 4, at 195-96 & n.238.
56. Anthropologist Karl Polanyi emphasizes the importance of denying the
mandatory nature of reciprocity. He notes that some "element of antagonism, however
diluted," must be present in bargaining. Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process,
in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 55, at 122, 131. Thus,
[n]o community intent on protecting the fount of solidarity between its members
can allow latent hostility to develop around a matter as vital to animal existence
and, therefore, capable of arousing as tense anxieties as food. Hence the
universal banning of transactions of a gainful nature in regard to food and
foodstuffs in primitive and archaic society.
Id.
57. Eric Posner notes that the practice of giving to enhance status is prevalent in
modern culture. See Posner, supra note 3, at 574-77.
58. See HELEN CODERE, FIGHTING WITH PROPERTY: A STUDY OF KWAKIUTL
POTLATCHING AND WARFARE 61,119 (1950); MAuSS, supra note 47, at 8, 42.
59. See Johnsen, supra note 50, at 42, 62-64.
60. See DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 22 (1988) (maintaining that gifts
constitute symbolic management of relationships) (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS
IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 194-99 (1971)); Baron, supra note 4,
at 196 (noting the role that gift-giving plays in establishing personal relationships); Barry
Schwartz, The Social Psychology of the Gift, 73 AM. J. Soc. 1, 1-4 (1967) (claiming that
gift-giving behavior generates identity and is used to control the behavior of others,
among other things).
61. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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ever to conceal the gift transaction's compulsory nature-admission
of the compulsory nature of the gift would destroy some of its value.
Consequently, we characterize market activity as blatantly self-
interested, in contrast with family life and personal relationships,
which supposedly are completely supportive and dominated by acts
of altruism and generosity. This well-accepted picture of two
distinctly separate environs has been reinforced by the traditional
legal description of contracts and gifts-the first belongs to the
market, the second to the realm of interpersonal relationships.62
Categorizing transfers in this way has obscured both the relevance of
gifts in modern culture and the continuing strength of the norm of
obligatory reciprocity.
Indeed, anthropologists who study contemporary culture
recognize the vital role that the reciprocity norm continues to play in
gift-giving behavior.63 For example, in some poor African-American
62. For an extended analysis and critique of the "exaggeration and reification" of the
distinction between gift and commodity in anthropological writing, see THE SOCIAL LIFE
OF THINGS, supra note 47.
63. See, e.g., CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY 32-44 (1974) (describing the vital role that the reciprocity norm
plays in the social life of a poor, African-American community). Paul Bohannan, who has
studied the Tiv of Nigeria (a culture with an established market system), concludes that
the gift transaction in Tiv culture also is characterized by the mandatory aspect of delayed
reciprocity. Again, the self-interested aspects of the gift, along with the mandatory duty
to reciprocate, is denied. See Bohannan, supra note 55, at 300, 303. Mauss and Levi-
Strauss, however, fail to grasp the important cultural role gift practices play in societies
with institutionalized market systems. Although Mauss recognizes the norms of the gift
culture at work in contemporary society, he sees gift practices as decidedly less relevant
than market transactions. As he puts it, "[t]he themes of the gift, of the freedom and the
obligation inherent in the gift, of generosity and self-interest that are linked in giving, are
reappearing in French society, as a dominant motif too long forgotten." MAUSS, supra
note 47, at 68. Levi-Strauss characterizes modem gift rituals as "diverting survivals which
engage the curiosity of the antiquarian." LEvI-STRAuSS, supra note 47, at 61.
Applying David Bruce Johnsen's thesis to contemporary gift practices, one might be
tempted to assume that the norm of mandatory reciprocity that characterized pre-market
gift practices vanished as the institutionalized market took control of all economic
activity. See Johnsen, supra note 50, at 58-67; supra note 52 (summarizing Johnsen's
thesis). But that conclusion does not necessarily follow. If gifts and giving behavior are
used to establish and strengthen relationships, which then provide a safety net of support
and fulfill numerous other crucial psychological and emotional functions, then the need to
discourage free-riding still exists.
Some sociologists have suggested that the inability to recognize the continuing
resonance of the gift transaction in modem culture might be the result of sexism. In the
modem world, women have been primarily responsible for relationship management and
gift transactions, with the result that the important role it continues to play has not been
studied or understood. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 8 (discussing the work of feminist
Nancy Hartsock). Certain of Levi-Strauss's observations about modem gift practices,
which view women as a commodity capable of being the subject of a gift, lend credence to
Cheal's and Hartsock's theses. See LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 67-68.
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communities, a norm of mandatory, reciprocal gift-giving establishes
strong social relationships that provide insurance against
destitution-in short, continuous giving between friends creates a
"safety net."'  The community ensures compliance with the
reciprocal giving norm by greeting those who free ride with vehement
disapproval and loss of reputation.65 In more affluent economies,
giving is less a matter of compensating for an inability to engage in
market transactions and more a means of managing relationships to
provide necessary emotional and psychological support.66
Sociologists have documented that, in the United States,
disinheritance occurs when testators perceive that heirs have failed to
provide that support and, consequently, the testator believes she has
been relieved of the duty to reciprocate by leaving an inheritance.67
In short, the reciprocity norm polices behavior to ensure the
provision of a wide variety of necessities that are not obtainable from
the market for one reason or another. Thus, even in modern times,
the distinction between gift and exchange is murky at best.
Political economists also understand gifts as involving elements
of exchange. Although they sharply disagree regarding whether and
to what extent gifts are motivated by altruism or self-interest, at a
base level political economists conceptualize gratuitous transfers as
reciprocal in nature. Some economists interpret empirical evidence
as consistent with a model of gratuitous transfers as motivated by
strategic concerns. 6  According to this model, the ability to make
gratuitous transfers, and, more importantly, to promise to make such
transfers, is a tool that the donor uses to obtain desired intangible
"goods" or "services" for which there is no comparable market
64. Carol Stack's study of life in a poor, midwestern African-American community
reveals a complex pattern of reciprocal giving that mirrors Mauss's classic description of
giving as obligatory and reciprocation as mandatory. See STACK, supra note 63, at 32-43.
65. See id. at 34. Although Stack sees this emphasis on giving as specific to the
culture of poverty, other studies suggest that norms of giving have force throughout
various classes in modem cultures with established markets, See id. at 43.
66. David Cheal, for instance, argues that although the principal function of gift-
giving among the middle class may no longer be to provide mutual economic aid, giving
continues to serve the crucial function of establishing and maintaining the emotional
aspects of social relationships. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 18-19.
67. See ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 91-93; SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 118-
20.
68. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045, 1045 (1985) (presenting econometric and other evidence that "bequests are
often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries"); Donald Cox, Motives
for Private Income Transfers, 5 J. POL. ECON. 508, 540-41 (1987) (focusing on motives for
inter vivos transfers and concluding that patterns for inter vivos transfers are more
consistent with exchange-related motives).
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substitute.69 Peter Blau, for one, has argued that social behavior that
appears to be motivated by altruism is actually only "apparent
altruism"-that is, giving is motivated by the expectation of some
reward, whether that award is power over another or something less
tangible, such as social approval.70
Other economists disagree and forcefully argue that gifts and
promises to make them are motivated predominately by altruism.7
Yet, the definition of altruism they employ does not preclude an
understanding of gratuitous transfers as exchange-based.
Specifically, if Donor D is altruistic, her utility function contains a
component that is equal to the utility function of another person, say
A. Thus, a transfer to A that increases A's well-being will, by
definition, increase D's well-being. In this model, D will not make
the transfer unless D believes that the transfer will actually increase
A's well-being. Even an altruistic transfer, therefore, is reciprocal in
nature-a transfer to A directly benefits D.
More importantly, whether D's utility function contains a
component equal to A's utility function is itself a result of reciprocity,
or a lack thereof. The reciprocity is inherent in the relationship itself,
rather than in a particular transaction. Altruism on D's part will arise
only where D finds her relationship with A sufficiently rewarding,
which will usually occur when D's and A's utilities are
interdependent, but may also occur under other circumstances. If,
over time, D receives nothing D values from A, D's altruism towards
A will decline accordingly.7' In this event, D may form other
attachments that better fill her needs.
Of course, both strategic and altruistic models of interpersonal
behavior can be criticized for assuming that personal relationships
69. For example, some donors use gift-giving as a tool for influencing children's
behavior. See Bernheim et al., supra note 68, at 1046 (showing that bequests are often
used to influence the behavior of potential beneficiaries). But see Andres G. Victorio &
Richard J. Arnott, Wealth, Bequests and Attention, 42 ECON. LETTERS 149, 150 (1993)
(arguing that a positive relationship between children's attention to parents and parental
health is not bequest-motivated).
70. See PETER M. BLAU, ExCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 17 (1964);
CHEAL, supra note 60, at 7 (citing BLAU, supra).
71. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063, 1090-
91 (1974) (concluding that altruism motivates transfers); see also James D. Adams,
Personal Wealth Transfers, 95 Q.J. ECON. 159, 161 (1980) (asserting that "persons who
transfer wealth ... are motivated by altruism"). According to this view, parents
maximize a utility function in which the utility of their children also enters, but they
engage in no strategic behavior.
72. As Gary Becker puts it, altruism may decline if the object of the altruism fails to
supply "merit goods." GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 10 (1991).
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mirror market transactions.73 But it is not necessary to adopt a
market model to understand that interdependent relationships
contain elements of reciprocity, emotional and otherwise. One can
reject the description of interpersonal relationships as based purely
on exchange and still understand that people invest in long-term,
reciprocally-based relationships for mutual support and aid.
In sum, most gratuitous promises implicate notions of
reciprocity. The reciprocal benefit may be a direct one; that is, the
promisor may incur an immediate benefit from the act of making the
particular promise. That benefit may be in the form of the
promisee's response to the promise or in the promisor's increased
well-being. Or, the promisor may receive nothing immediate or
tangible in exchange for a particular promise but may make the
promise in furtherance of an interdependent or long-term
relationship, from which the promisor has benefited in the past
and/or expects to benefit in the future. Here, the element of
reciprocity is inherent in the context of the relationship in which the
promise is made rather than in an isolated transaction.
II. RECIPROCITY AND THE FAMILY
Giving behavior is informed by a cultural norm of mandatory
reciprocity. Giving is distinct from bargaining, because both the giver
and the donee deny the reciprocal nature of the gift. Yet the strength
of the reciprocity norm stands as evidence that gifts cannot properly
be viewed as one-shot, unilateral acts. Rather, gifts occur within a
context of exchange.
This Part develops this argument further. First, it explores the
crucial role that reciprocity plays in the establishment and
maintenance of trust-based relationships. It shows that the parties'
willingness to acknowledge explicitly the mandatory nature of the
reciprocity norm, and its influence on the relationship, declines as
trust increases. This Part also explains why family relationships are
often the most stable and long-term relationships in which individuals
73. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 8. Cheal comments that:
Nancy Hartsock has pointed out that grand theories derived from the
political economy of market relations have not paid sufficient attention to the
experiences of women within the sexual division of labor .... "[O]ne could begin
to see the outline of a very different kind of community if one took the
mother/infant relation rather than market exchange as the prototypic human
interaction."




are engaged. Finally, it shows how family members view inheritance
as a final act of giving that flows naturally from the reciprocal, trust-
based relationships that family members enjoyed during life. In
accordance with the reciprocity norm, family members expect that
testators will disinherit closest family members only when those
family members have themselves failed to comply with the
reciprocity norm, and when non-relatives have stepped in to fulfill
the role that family ordinarily would provide. The assumption that
family members who have conformed with the reciprocity norm will
inherit is so strong that it is akin to an implied promise.
A. Family Relationships: Trust and Reciprocity
1. The Role of Trust
Individuals cannot develop, thrive, or function effectively
without a variety of human interactions. Most obviously, we must
interact to meet our basic material needs for food, clothing, and
shelter-few of us could provide these necessities in sufficient
quantities acting alone. In addition, we rely on ideas and knowledge
gained from others to pursue various life projects, whether they be
acquiring specialized job skills or more creative endeavors. Without
the knowledge derived from others, each individual would be forced
(perhaps literally) to reinvent the wheel.74  Finally, and most
importantly, we rely on interaction with others to satisfy a variety of
fundamental psychological and emotional needs.75 For example,
early interaction with a loving parental figure is an essential
component for healthy infant development.76  Furthermore, most
people need various types of emotional support throughout different
periods in their lives.
If human interaction is necessary to satisfy most basic human
needs, what form does such interaction take? Over time, established
market systems have evolved to satisfy certain categories of needs,
most notably economic ones. It is fairly clear that in our complex and
74. Jeanne Schroeder, invoking Hegel, has noted that "[tihe individual cannot exist
except through concrete relationships with other individuals." Jeanne Lorraine
Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the
Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REv. 55, 136 (1994).
75. See STEVE DUCK, UNDERSTANDING RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1991) (stating that
research shows that "[t]he support of friends, neighbours and relatives is a social support
that acts as an important safeguard against occupational stress, psychological illness,
unhappy life events and the like").
76. See generally ANNA FREUD & DOROTHY BURLINGHAM, INFANTS WITHOUT
FAMILIES (1944) (discussing the role child-parent bonding plays in infant development).
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specialized society certain tangible needs are best satisfied through
participation in arms-length, market-based transactions.77 Thus, we
obtain clothing from retail stores, food from the grocer, and medical
care from our doctor. We obtain knowledge and information by
paying college tuition, participating in employee-training programs,
paying for Internet access, or consulting a physician. We bury our
dead by obtaining the services of a mortuary. The market has
become the primary means for satisfaction of most material needs.
But what of the other needs that must be fulfilled by human
interaction? For example, how do we ensure that we will obtain the
emotional support that we may require? It goes without saying that
we do not look to the market for fulfillment of many fundamental
needs. Certain specific needs cannot be satisfied in the market
because those needs cannot, and indeed should not, be commodified.
For other needs, market exchange is a sub-optimal means of
satisfaction-put differently, although there may be market-based
options for need fulfillment, greater value can be attained if those
needs are satisfied outside of the market.7 For that category of
needs, we seek market solutions only when other avenues are
foreclosed.79
The market is simply not capable of satisfying certain basic
needs. For example, suppose Sheila loses her job when her company
"downsizes." During the difficult period before she finds anotherjob, she may desire a heightened amount of emotional support. She
might need someone to listen to the story of the horrible interview
she had that day; she might seek advice regarding how she is
perceived by others to enable her to interview more effectively; or
she might simply want some company after a bad day. Obviously,
Sheila will not advertise for and contract with someone to fill those
needs. What she seeks is a human response based on love, and love is
not inspired by money. Certainly, one might be induced to feign love
if the price is right, but the very fact that this supportive behavior was
purchased in the market exposes the false character of the
expression. The act of commodification strips the exchange of its
77. Mauss viewed the modem separation of market transactions and moral and
spiritual principles as impoverishing. See MAUSS, supra note 47, at 66-77.
78. See DUCK, supra note 75, at 21 (noting that although services may be
"'purchased' by means other than friendship... [o]ne reason why many rich people feel
friendless is precisely because they get used to buying help with money rather than by
bartering their love or services in return").
79. For one scholar's conceptualization of these categories, see Margaret Radin,




Further, most market transactions cannot act to define self-
image and affect reputation as fully as non-market gestures can. If-
as some social scientists suggest-self-image and reputation are
constructed, to some extent, by social interaction,81 the modem
marketplace is a limited avenue in which to make the requisite
expressions. For example, when I purchase bread at the grocery
store, I attach no moral significance to the transaction-the act of
paying for the bread has no added dimension. I make no statement,
to the cashier or to myself, regarding my character. I do not attempt
to define the terms of an interpersonal relationship between us or set
the stage for future interactions. I do not suppose that the act of
paying for the bread in any way affects my reputation within some
larger community. The transaction is exactly what it purports to be-
a purchase of bread. The only statement I make is: "I have the
money for the bread and I am willing to give you that money if you
give me the bread." In short, there is no recognized moral
component attached to the transaction. To the extent that people
continue to construct self-image and reputation through action, the
market is a limited resource for doing so.'m
Certain needs may be capable of fulfillment through market
exchange, but in a way that generates less value than a non-market
solution would. In that sense, the market functions as a substitute
when needs cannot be filled through a preferred method. For
example, Herman might have a greater sense of well-being if he
satisfies his desire for sex through a loving, committed relationship
than if he pays for the services of a prostitute. He knows the
prostitute is entirely self-interested-she sleeps with him for the
money. In contrast, sex with a significant other is not only satisfying
in itself, but it has other benefits: It reaffirms Herman's sense that he
is attractive and loved, and he may experience pleasure from giving
80. See id. at 1907-08; see also RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM
HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 245 (1971) (arguing that "the commercialization of
blood ... represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, ... limits
both personal and professional freedoms," and creates other costs).
81. See, e.g., DUCK, supra note 75, at 21-22 (asserting that interaction with friends
contributes to positive self-esteem, both because friends provide support and because
they allow us to support them); id. at 24 (citing Steve Duck & Martin Lea, Breakdown of
Personal Relationships and the Threat to Personal Identity, in THREATENED IDENTITIES
53 (Glynis M. Breakwell ed., 1983)) (asserting that interaction with friends helps to
support and integrate each person's personality).
82. Of course, marketplace transactions can be used to convey status, taste, and class
standing. But it is a limiting venue for constructing and exhibiting many other important
character traits, especially those with a moral component.
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pleasure to his partner. Rose, an elderly woman confined to her
home with a broken ankle, might value care provided by her niece
more than care for which she contracts with a social service agency.
Again, care provided by her niece confers benefits other than the
value of the care itself-Rose also feels loved. Although Alison
would probably appreciate the support she receives from a
bereavement counselor after the death of her husband, emotional
support provided by a close friend or relative might be even more
valuable because it is entirely voluntary.
In sum, the market has evolved because it meets a variety of
material needs quite well. Yet, it is an extremely limited resource for
the satisfactory fulfillment of a wide variety of other, less tangible
needs. How do we ensure that these less tangible needs are met with
the same ease with which we satisfy material needs through the
market? We satisfy them through a system of long-term relationships
founded on trust-trust that is forged by strict allegiance to the
principles of reciprocity. The following paragraphs explain why trust
is a fundamental component of this system and how trust is
established, in part, through principles of reciprocity.
Why is trust necessary? That is, assuming that some needs
cannot be met through market exchange, why not have a system of
express social exchanges? Consider several situations that most of us
will experience during our lives: our parents will die, loved ones will
become ill, our careers may become shaky. In each of those
situations, we may find ourselves with an increased need for social
support yet less than our usual ability to be interesting company. But
we will be unable to arrange the desired support through a system of
express, discrete exchanges. For one, what we seek is emotional
support motivated by love-an express exchange would be motivated
by self-interest. Moreover, the person providing the support would
reap little gain, so the transaction might not occur. Finally, consider
the "costs," if you will, of identifying an appropriate "provider":
First, the person in need, whose resources must largely be devoted to
managing the crisis, must spend additional time and energy to
determine who is most capable of fulfilling the particular need.
Second, each party would have to determine the other's motive and
make a determination regarding the other's trustworthiness. 83
Moreover, ambiguities inherent in each "transaction" would have to
83. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 17 (citing David Cheal, Transactions and




be worked out. The ridiculous picture that this conjures up-of
individuals desperately "bargaining" for emotional support during a
time of crisis-is a testament to its undesirability.
So, we need a system that is responsive to fluctuating needs-a
system that induces others to provide support even when we do not
expressly request it, and even when there is no immediate benefit to
the providers; a system that temporarily relieves us of the burden of
payment and of devoting resources to the calculation or protection of
our own self-interest; a system upon which we can depend. In short,
we need a system based on trust.84
2. Building Trust Through Reciprocity
How is trust established? Reciprocity is a key element in
maintaining and establishing trust-based relationships.8 5 First, the
impetus for all social interaction is the satisfaction of some form of
need, whether it be for love, companionship, financial support, or a
myriad of others. Successful interaction requires another person for
whom satisfying that need is self-satisfying. For example, an
individual might seek a marriage partner to fill a variety of needs: for
love, support, financial stability, children. That individual will pursue
a relationship with another when he or she perceives a particular
other as capable of satisfying those needs. For that second person's
part, he or she will enter into the relationship only if he or she
perceives that there is some benefit in doing so. Thus, reciprocity
plays a role in the formation of many relationships.86
In addition to facilitating the development of a relationship,
reciprocity also enables trust to develop within the relationship. For
example, consider a relationship between adult strangers. The
parties will establish trust through a series of reciprocal actions that
both confer specific benefits and telegraph future availability.
Suppose Carol and Margaret meet at a P.T.A. meeting and find they
have many things in common. Whether or not their acquaintanceship
grows into a trust-based relationship may depend on a variety of
factors. Suppose Carol must work late, and she asks Margaret to pick
84. See BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 8 (1983) (establishing
that "[t]he fundamental importance of trust in social relationships and social systems is
attested to by social thinkers and theorists of widely divergent theoretical persuasions");
see also id. at 21 (stating that "[t]rust is an integrative mechanism that creates and
sustains solidarity in social relationships and systems").
85. See id. at 21 (stating that "[tirust is never wholly realized in social relationships;
maintaining it is a reciprocal and endless task for all"); DUCK, supra note 75, at 7
(establishing that reciprocity and trust are crucial to the development of friendships).
86. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 11 (citing Cheal, supra note 83, at 141-42).
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up her children from school. If Margaret does so, Carol's positive
feelings for Margaret will increase. Carol will also be more likely to
say yes when Margaret calls a few weeks later and asks Carol if she
will babysit for a few hours. 7 If Margaret and Carol continue to
reciprocate for favors in this way, the relationship between them will
deepen. If the care provided extends to emotional support, the trust
will deepen further." For example, suppose Margaret's mother dies,
and Carol responds to the news by immediately going to Margaret's
house and cooking dinner for the family and providing emotional
support. Carol has telegraphed her availability to Margaret, who will
be even more likely to provide a similar level of support if and when
Carol needs it.
Margaret and Carol will also cement the trust between them by
giving gifts. The gifts may be redundant, that is, they may not fill a
need that the donee could not herself satisfy.89 Yet gifts within the
context of this relationship will serve a variety of important functions.
First, the act of gift-giving telegraphs continued availability to the
other.9°  It is an expression of continued commitment to the
relationship. Second, the act of giving a gift may confirm the giver's
self-image as altruistic and kind. Third, it may add to the giver's
reputation as a generous person. Thus, gifts within the relationship
not only deepen trust but may serve as a means of self-expression.
Of course, lack of reciprocity will stall a budding relationship in
its tracks91 and may lead to the deterioration of an established
relationship. 9 Suppose that when Margaret asks Carol to babysit for
a few hours, Carol explains that she is too busy. If Carol continues to
ask for favors but does not reciprocate, Margaret is likely to cool the
relationship-she will feel "used." Similarly, if Carol routinely
supplies emotional support to Margaret but finds that Margaret is
87. See DUCK, supra note 75, at 7 (noting that one of the "rules" of friendship is that
each friend will repay debts and favors).
88. Duck states that in less intimate relationships, only services are exchanged;
intimacy deepens as friends exchange confidences, opinions, and advice. Providing only
services to another is a subtle way of telling the other that the relationship will not
develop into a friendship. See id. at 20-21.
89. See id. at 12-13.
90. See id. at 18.
91. See id. at 7 (stating that a violation of the "rules" of friendship, one of which is the
mandate to repay "debts and favours," can become grounds for dissolution of the
relationship).
92 See, e.g., GERALD R. LESLIE, THE FAMILY IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 554 (1973)
(stating that what he calls the "companionship" aspect of marriage may erode as
husbands devote more time to work than to marriage and wives become less interested in
the sexual aspect of the marriage, perhaps in response to the husband's lack of attention).
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generally unsympathetic to Carol, Carol will transfer her attention to
a different relationship.
Reciprocity is also relevant to the development and sustenance
of trust in relationships between biological family members.
Consider a mother and her child, for example. The child first turns to
his mother for support, not because he trusts her, but because he has
no other choice. The mother satisfies the child's needs, not because
she expects something back, but because she loves her son and feels a
sense of responsibility toward him.93 The love between mother and
son may endure forever, but it does not necessarily follow that trust
also will endure. For example, suppose that the mother is
negligent-she leaves her son alone while she goes to bars, she is
insensitive to his emotional needs, she leaves him with others for long
periods. The son will learn that, although he may love his mother, he
cannot trust her. Over time, he may lessen his efforts to satisfy her
needs-for instance, he may engage in acts that displease her or
expend energy in developing compensatory relationships. The
mother's failure to return her son's love (by this I mean she fails to
behave in a way that he perceives as loving) will decrease her son's
trust. Conversely, the son may be the one who fails to reciprocate.
Suppose an adult child becomes wealthy but neglects to visit his
mother or share his wealth with her. Although the mother may
continue to love her son, she will not trust that he will provide
support of any kind-his failure to reciprocate for all she feels she
has given him will be perceived as a breach of trust. When the
benefits continuously flow in only one direction, trust will
deteriorate. 94
Of course, the concept of reciprocity is not generally
symmetrical; parties do not conduct a series of tit-for-tat transactions.
That is, Carol may not feel that Margaret "owes her one" because
Carol babysat. A mother might not characterize her demand for
93. Cf. T. Berry Brazelton et al., Early Mother-Infant Reciprocity, in PARENT-
INFANT INTERACrION 137, 147-48 (1975) (establishing that most mother-infant
relationships involve a rhythm of reciprocity and that the infant becomes distressed when
the mother breaks the rhythm by failing to respond). See generally 1 JOHN BOWLBY,
ATrACHMENT (1969) (exploring the mother-child bond).
94. Cf. ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 34, 37 (chronicling the breakdown of family
bonds when the elderly are abandoned by their children); STACK, supra note 63, at 48
(noting that within the African-American community, the failure to provide adequate
support to children leads to community censure and a loss of rights to those children;
others take custody and, according to norms, have decisionmaking power over the
children); Brazelton, supra note 93, at 145-46 (establishing that when normal reciprocal
interaction between infant and mother is disturbed, the infant gradually stops looking to
its mother for reassurance and engages in self-comforting behavior).
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certain behavior from her child as her reward for fifteen hours of
labor or years of sleepless nights (but then again, she might). The
key to trust is that such an accounting is, at least on the surface,
absent.95  As in primitive cultures, the parties must deny the
reciprocal nature of the relationship to achieve full benefits from it.
The fact that reciprocation is delayed further helps to obscure its
existence.
Explore another example: marriage. A marriage will be
mutually satisfactory as long as there is a general sense that each
party is equally committed to the relationship and expresses that
commitment by acting in a supportive and giving fashion. But the
parties generally must deny the reciprocal nature of the
relationship.96 Again, giving is not symmetrical, in more than one
sense. First, one party might put up with a lack of emotional support
because he appreciates a certain level of financial support, for
instance. In other words, the objects of the exchange will vary
depending upon the specific needs of the individual parties. Second,
because the needs of the partners will vary over time, there may be
periods in which one partner is intensely giving while the other
mostly takes. The more giving partner gives for a complex mixture of
reasons: some combination of love and self-interest, in gratitude for
benefits received in the past and in reliance of obtaining reciprocal
benefits in the future, and perhaps because he values his self-image as
a "giving" person. If trust is sufficiently strong, the relationship can
sustain an imbalance for some period of time, but eventually the
party who perceives himself to be giving more than he is getting
might become dissatisfied. It is the perceived commitment to the
other that sustains the relationship. Commitment is symbolized by
acts of giving, whether the gifts are tangible or intangible.
3. Whom Do We Trust?
All of the foregoing raises an obvious threshold question:
Whom do we trust? Modem society is large and complex, and
resources that can be invested in establishing and maintaining
relationships are limited.97 If we began our search for trust-based
95. See, e.g., DUCK, supra note 75, at 20 (noting that the more intimate the
relationship, the less likely friends are to expressly reciprocate); STACK, supra note 63, at
41-42 (noting that reciprocity is asymmetrical, or delayed).
96. Thus, Hegel viewed marriage as an agreement to end contracting. See HEGEL,
supra note 14, at 203.
97. See DUCK, supra note 75, at 2 (stating that research shows that "relationships are
extremely complex entities that need careful management and demand skills from their
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relationships from scratch, the investment in identifying appropriate
people would be unmanageable; we would do nothing but attempt to
connect and construct relationships. How do we determine with
whom we should form trust-based relationships?
Sociologist David Cheal asserts that the foundations of trust-
based relationships in a complex society consist of three factors.
First, standardized forms of relationships have evolved, and a
common understanding exists as to the general duties attached to
various roles.9 Second, individuals develop a network of trust-based
relationships that are long-term.99 Third, individuals who form trust-
based relationships must regularly telegraph their continuing
availability to each other.1°0 These factors enable us to commit more
resources to the development of trust within relationships and fewer
to the project of identifying possible significant others.
Established categories of relationships have evolved and thrive
as a result of the need to minimize the costs of establishing the terms
of relationships. The established rules and roles within the
relationships create a common understanding regarding reciprocal
expectations and obligations.'0' Refer back to Carol and Margaret,
our two friends. The standardized role of "friend" creates a common
understanding of reciprocal duties and entitlements, and the limits
thereof.l1 For instance, both women might expect generally
supportive behavior from the other but will understand that the
needs of their immediate families will usually come first. Both
women might expect a degree of loyalty from the other.10 3 Similarly,
the standardized roles of "husband" and "wife" create common, yet
implicit, understandings. For example, both understand that they will
participants at all times"); id. at 3 (asserting that "'relationshipping' is actually a very
complicated and prolonged process with many pitfalls and challenges").
98. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 16-17.
99. See id.; see also BARBER, supra note 84, at 10-11 (discussing Luhman's theory
that establishing trust-based relationships helps reduce the complexity of social life).
100. See CHEAL, supra note 60, at 16-17.
101. See BARBER, supra note 84, at 14-15 (explaining that people trust others to
perform their "roles" competently); DUCK, supra note 75, at 20 (stating that "the
relationship between two people is most often defined by what the people in it provide for
one another, resources that they distribute and exchange" and noting that those who
exchange only services are acquaintances whereas friends exchange confidences).
102. See DUCK, supra note 75, at 7 (citing sociological research demonstrating that
people share a common understanding of what the role "friend" demands).
103. See id. (citing K.E. Davis & M. Todd, Assessing Friendship: Prototypes, Paradigm
Cases, and Relationship Description, in UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
(S.W. Duck & D. Perlman eds., 1985) (demonstrating that most people expect a friend to
be honest, show affection, share confidences, provide necessary help, act in a trustworthy
manner, share time and activities, treat us with respect, and work through disputes)).
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not have sexual relationships with others and that doing so would
constitute a betrayal of trust.1°4 They understand that they will pool
their financial resources, instead of holding them separately, and that
they will agree on some method of maximizing the welfare of the
unit, whether they define value in financial terms or by other criteria
such as self-actualization. Each probably expects the other to be his
or her primary means of emotional support and to consider his or her
needs before the needs of friends and distant relatives most of the
time. Each expects the other to act in a manner that generally is
giving and loving.
But the standardization of roles gives us only a very general
sense of reciprocal expectations. As human beings, we can expect
others to respond to the various demands that may arise through the
course of a relationship with infinite variation. Thus, agreeing to
accept standardized roles is only an initial step in establishing a
trusting relationship. Resources must be committed to
understanding an individual's personality in order to determine the
extent to which that particular individual can be trusted to respond
positively in any given situation.105 Resources must also be applied to
nurturing the relationship.' Accordingly, people stabilize
interaction by limiting the number of persons with whom they engage
in interdependent relationships. The development of a few
relationships over time leads to greater predictability regarding the
extent of the other's trustworthiness and likely response to various
situations. As trust increases, parties to the relationship increase
their investment, both in gratitude for past benefits conferred by the
other, and in reliance on the implied promise of future support.
In sum, we have established that stable, long-term relationships
based on trust are a necessary precondition to the fulfillment of a
wide variety of fundamental needs. But attempting to form and
sustain such relationships in a complex society is difficult given the
wide variety of options and the anonymous nature of our culture.
Accordingly, systems have evolved to simplify the process; we limit
the number of people with whom we seek to engage in intimate
relationships, and we have developed standardized roles that alert us
to the best potential candidates.
104. This social norm is reflected in various statutes, such as those that establish
adultery as grounds for divorce, see, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988),
and those that prevent a neglectful spouse from taking an elective share, see, e.g., N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1998).




4. The Family: The Primary Standardized Long-Term Relationship
The most obvious and well-established examples of standardized
relationships in western culture are those that exist within the family.
It is a fair assumption that most people share a generalized
understanding of the various duties and obligations that attach to
each particular familial role, although there is a wide variety of
behavior within specific relationships. To be sure, the specific
understanding of particular roles has changed drastically in the last
thirty years. But it is safe to say that it is generally assumed that
parents will provide their children with love, financial support, and
some degree of education (hence the term "deadbeat dad"); 7 that
children will strive to be respectful to their parents and act in a way
that pleases them; that older children will care for aging parents; that
husbands and wives will be each other's primary source of emotional
support;' and that family members will act to benefit the whole-or
at least refrain from causing harm to other members. Most
importantly, it is generally assumed that immediate family members
will be the primary source of emotional support, both generally and
in times of crisis.0 9
The evolution of a standardized definition of "family" that
emphasizes the primacy of the relationships makes sense from a
variety of perspectives. A child will naturally look to her parents for
the satisfaction of basic human needs. In post-industrial societies,
where families live together but generally do not join with other
families, we first look to those with whom we live for support.
Because most parents respond positively, the roles become
standardized. The fact that the role of parent is standardized
telegraphs to parents the scope of their obligations. Once a
psychological bond has been formed, it makes sense that the parties
would turn to each other first. Turning to immediate family
decreases the cost of searching for potential providers."0 That the
majority of family members do in fact become each other's main
107. Again, this norm is reflected in legislation, specifically in laws requiring parents to
provide support for children. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 32-33 (McKinney 1988).
108. See BARBER, supra note 84, at 38-44 (discussing standardized roles of "husband"
and "wife" and the changes in our understanding of those roles).
109. See, e.g., id. at 26 (stating that "[i]t is an everyday and valued conception in our
society that the family is the primordial source and location of trust").
110. Sociobiologists might argue that it would be natural for an individual to satisfy
basic needs through reciprocal, interdependent relationships with closest relatives
because supporting closest relatives would also help perpetuate the individual's gene
pool. See ROBERT WRIGHT, ThE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
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providers cements role standardization, which in turn creates
expectations that family members will act accordingly.
Of course, family members generally do not conceive of family
roles as the exclusive means by which to satisfy needs. We expect
family members to develop friendships with others and children
gradually to depend less on parental support and more on others,
eventually forming their own families. When family trust thrives,
however, the family functions as a sort of "safety net"-family
members know that when others cannot provide support, family will
step in to help."'
The standardization of family roles leads family members to
harbor a general set of expectations regarding their obligations
toward other members and others' obligations to them.' If, as in
most cases, trust intensifies over time, reliance on that trust will
increase. When family relationships are functional, they are the
primary relationship to which most people look for satisfaction of
needs. It follows that trust-based family relationships often create
greater expectations and provoke more reliance than do relationships
outside the family.
To illustrate, assume X is a first-year law student. Suppose X's
elderly neighbor Y has broken a hip. X is a reasonably thoughtful
and generous person. X may make gifts to help out her neighbor.
For example, she might bake some casseroles or offer to pick things
up at the market. But at some point, X must decide whether she can
afford the cost of providing care. For example, she is unlikely to
provide substantial nursing care to her neighbor because doing so
would drastically interfere with her studies. She is likely to give as
much as she can without incurring substantial costs to herself. Given
the standardized definitions of neighborly behavior, Y is unlikely to
expect X to make such a sacrifice. Rather, Y is likely to pay for
services that she needs above and beyond what her neighbors and
friends can provide, such as full- or part-time nursing care. Or, Y
might pay X to provide more in the way of care, an arrangement that
X will accept only if the reward outweighs the costs to her education.
If it came to that, the parties would be likely to agree expressly on
the amount of care and the cost, because both understand those
services to be beyond the normal scope of the neighbor-neighbor
111. See BARBER, supra note 84, at 27 (stating that "[tihe shared tasks and values, the
endless, minute, and changing obligations among family members, seem to be most
efficiently handled by mutual trust").
112. See SussMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9.
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relationship. In any case, X is unlikely to incur substantial costs in
the vague hope that Y will substantially compensate X later by
reciprocating in a substantial way or by bestowing a financial benefit
such as a bequest.
Now suppose instead that X's mother, M, has the broken hip.
First, the gross costs that X is willing to incur to provide care to her
mother will likely be greater than those she was willing to bear to
care for Y. For one, X has a sense of duty springing from the
standardized nature of the mother-daughter relationship. This sense
is likely strengthened by the specific history of a reciprocal, trusting,
interdependent relationship. Satisfaction of that sense of duty inures
a benefit to X and offsets the overall cost she will incur. Second, X's
action is but one moment in an ongoing reciprocal relationship-X
therefore understands that her mother has provided and will provide
reciprocal benefits to her when she needs them, perhaps including a
provision for X in her mother's will. The expectation that her mother
will continue to provide for her in times of need might encourage X
to incur more significant costs presently than she otherwise would.
The intensity of the trust in a functioning family inspires
members to rely on expectations of future benefit inspired by that
trust. Members are encouraged to support each other, sometimes
even at substantial cost, both in gratitude for the past benefits of the
relationship and out of a sense of expectation of future assistance.
Reliance on trust confers a maximum benefit to the parties involved.
B. The Role of Implicit Understandings and Reliance
A family system that routinizes trust and encourages reliance on
implied obligations provides a resource for satisfying fundamental
needs that could not be duplicated in a system based on arms-length
transactions. Moreover, the key to maximizing the value of the family
system is the implicit and unarticulated nature of the reciprocal
relationships. Specifically, the implicit nature of the system
maximizes value by allowing the parties to view the provision of
goods, services, and attention as motivated solely by altruism, even
when self-interest might actually play a part. This, in turn, stabilizes
the relationships and provides a safety net of support. An alternative
system based on express agreements would destroy most, if not all, of
the potential value of the relationship.
First, standardization of family roles and the trust that builds
from those roles creates a benefit; as family members learn to trust
each other and relationships are cemented, members experience
gains. They each know that if the future should prove difficult, the
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other family members will be there to provide support. Even if day-
to-day contact becomes limited and relationships with non-relatives
develop, most view family as providing a safety net-if all else fails,
the family will be there. 3
Second, we all value the belief that we mean something to
others-especially to those in whom we have invested most heavily,
who tend to be close family members. Thus, if we view the provision
of care, services, or attention by a family member as motivated by
love that we have inspired, we will value that attention more than we
would if we perceived it to be motivated by self-interest. Refer back
to mother, M. She might value regular care from her daughter, which
she perceives as motivated by love, more than care from others of
whose motives she is less certain. Thus, M might perceive visits by
church members as motivated more by a sense of religious duty than
by love that M has inspired. Certainly, M will value care provided by
her daughter more than similar care by a paid provider. M's
attribution of altruistic motives to her daughter could create other
benefits as well; for example, the fact that her daughter wants to
provide that care makes M feel as though she had been a good
parent. But if M perceives that X is motivated by self-interest (for
example, she expects a reward for her behavior), M will receive less
value from the care X provides-in fact, she may value such care
even less than she would value care by a paid provider. At least the
professional's desire for compensation is expected and does not
symbolize a failure of a trust-based relationship.
It seems reasonable to assume that almost every human is self-
interested to some degree. We need to put food on the table, we
have certain basic material desires, we would like to succeed at our
jobs. All of these projects require some element of self-interest and
may at times cause conflict with our altruistic impulses. 4 One does
not have to believe that family members are generally selfish actors,
masquerading as altruists in order to exploit the other members of
the family, to understand that self-interested motives might at times
conflict with altruistic impulses.
113. Of course, people other than family members might fill those needs. But if the
family member refuses to provide support-if the person in need is "forced" to go outside
the relationship-some of the previously built-up trust is destroyed. The safety net has
holes. Just as parties create value by building up a relationship of trust that provides each
of them with security, the parties destroy value when they fail to live up to expectations
by refusing to perform reciprocal obligations.
114. Of course, even pure altruists have limited resources-they cannot care for
everyone in need indiscriminately.
115. And our altruistic impulses may conflict with one another: We may have an
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For example, refer back to M and X. It is likely that X would
choose to give substantial care to her mother even if M were destitute
and X were aware of that fact. But the fact that the daughter could
not expect any compensation might affect her decision regarding how
to apply her limited resources. For instance, her desire to earn a law
degree, driven by a belief that she will be more capable of supporting
herself and her family, including her mother, might be more intense
than her desire to provide all the care her mother requires; thus, she
might view the decision to abandon her studies or do poorly in school
as not viable. As a result, she might be inclined to enlist the help of
another relative, or supplement care with paid support.
Comparatively, if X believes that some reciprocal compensation will
come her way at her mother's death, that fact will likely influence X's
assessment of how to allocate her limited resources. Her response
might amount to clear detrimental reliance on the implied promise of
an inheritance-for instance, X might decide to drop out of law
school to nurse her mother. Or, she might alter her behavior in
subtler, though important, ways-the expectation of inheritance
might affect her choice of which job to accept, how much volunteer
work to do, what hours to work, or how much to save. When
altruism runs out, the (conscious or subconscious) assumption that
one will be compensated financially for current reliance may
encourage transactions in the family system. Nevertheless, the
transaction will be more valuable to M if she believes that her
daughter provides care out of love, not because she expects an
inheritance. Therefore, the concept of delayed reciprocity and the
implicit nature of the "exchange" allows the parties to obtain
maximum value-M can feel good about how much she is loved, and
X can feel good about doing right by her mother.
The keys to maximizing the value of familial relationships are
building trust and obscuring the role of self-interest. Trust will thrive
when the parties conform to the reciprocity norm. The denial of self-
interested motives (to the extent that they exist) is facilitated by the
fact that reciprocity is delayed; that is, reciprocal actions are not
taken immediately but are manifested over time.
In short, express agreement in the family context is virtually
impossible. Because-the system is based on trust, it would never
altruistic connection toward a variety of people but possess limited resources, which
requires us to choose our preferences at various times.
116. Of course, to the extent that M is altruistic, she will discourage X from dropping
out of law school or doing something else that she perceives as detrimental to X's best
interests.
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occur to most of us to conceptualize the give and take of family life as
an "exchange" or "bargain." Because we trust others to respond in
accordance with reciprocity norms, we would not even think it
necessary to obtain assurances.11 7  Of course, even if express
agreement were otherwise possible, the constantly shifting status of
relative duties and entitlement in a long-term, intimate relationship
would make express agreement impracticable. Thus, family members
are effectively forced to rely on trust that others will not abandon the
reciprocal principles underlying the relationship.
The family system, when it works, is a wonderfully rich way to
obtain necessary and fundamental emotional and psychological
benefits. Because the key to the value of the relationships within the
family is the implicit nature of the exchange and the trust that the
others will honor notions of reciprocity, we would rarely, if ever,
expect to see family members reduce implicit understandings to
express agreement. What we would expect to see is reliance on trust.
III. RECIPROCITY AND WILLS LAW
Judges and juries have internalized societal norms concerning
relationship formation and development. They bring these innate
understandings to their determination of will contests. Courts
examine a testator's relationships with the parties to a will contest to
determine whether the contestant reasonably interpreted words and
actions of the testator as implying a promise of inheritance. Courts
know that the more interdependent the relationship, the less likely
the parties are to reduce understandings to express agreement and
the more likely they are to trust one another to behave in accordance
with those implied understandings. Courts intuitively understand
that the testator may have obtained benefits by implying a promise to
reciprocate by leaving relatives a share in her estate. And courts, by
manipulating doctrine, often recognize and give effect to the
obligation that the "promisor" has voluntarily incurred.
Specifically, when the testator's will primarily benefits someone
who is not one of the testator's closest relatives, courts are hesitant to
give effect to the will if the testator's closest family members contest
117. Even if we did, it would be impossible to obtain the information necessary to
assess the likelihood of performance without devaluing the relationship. It would be bad
enough if the potential provider were to say "Sure I'll care for you, just remember me in
your will." It would be even worse if she requests specific information about the
relative's assets and other obligations and the exact amount the relative intends to devise.
In that sense, the "transaction" is the mirror image of what occurs in the market place,
where parties expect each other to try to obtain as much information as possible.
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it."8 The outcomes of cases and the language many courts use to
justify their decisions suggest that the decision to give effect to a will
depends less on whether the court believes that the will satisfies the
formalities statute or embodies the testator's intent and more on
whether the testator's decision to disinherit closest family members is
justifiable in light of social norms."9 Specifically, courts seem to
consider whether the testator and her closest relatives enjoyed a
trust-based relationship that by its nature would have created implied
understandings from which the parties benefited and on which they
relied. If such a relationship appeared to be in place, a court will
likely find some reason to invalidate the will-thus causing the
testator's estate to be distributed via the intestacy statutes to the
testator's closest family members. Conversely, if no trust-based
relationship appeared to be functioning, either because it never
existed or because contestant family members appear to have
breached it, courts will honor the testator's autonomy and give effect
to the will.
A. Interdependency and the Implied Promise of Inheritance
What leads family members to believe that they will obtain an
inheritance? It is one thing to say that family members come to
depend on each other in reliance on trust. It is another to say that
family members have a specific expectation of inheritance even when
there has been no express promise to that effect.
First, family members generally are aware of the cultural
tradition of passing wealth intergenerationally. The vast majority of
Americans bequeath their estates to their spouse, children, or closest
relatives,'12 and most give larger amounts to those who shoulder
118. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
246-55, 260-68 (1996). In preparation for that article, I examined (within a randomly
chosen five-year period between December 31, 1984, and January 1, 1990) all reported
cases that considered the issue of undue influence in reviewing motions for summary
judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (160 cases total). I
also read and analyzed a voluminous number of formalities cases. See id. at 260-68, 275-
78. Although that article establishes that courts bring a preference for blood relatives to
will contest cases, it does not explain why courts do so, nor does it identify the specific
social norm that courts support. This Article attempts to complete the project by
identifying the role of the family reciprocity norm in wills cases.
119. See id. at 255-58.
120. Studies by sociologists suggest that only some six to seven percent of testators
disinherit their closest relatives. See, e.g., ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 89 & n.14 (citing
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 86-104). Rosenfeld also establishes that "the
dominant belief among American families [is] that writing relatives or children out of
someone's will is downright immoral." Id. at 89.
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substantially greater burdens of care.2
Second, a devise flows naturally as the final act of reciprocity in
an ongoing relationship-inheritance is viewed as a statement of
reward, and so long as family members have taken care of each other,
they expect the reciprocal nature of the relationship to continue to
the end.Y Moreover, family members, through actions and offhand
remarks, may reinforce this expectation, and may even make
statements of intention outright.
But why shouldn't a court adjudicating a will contest presume
that the will's beneficiary has a reciprocity-based claim that is equally
as persuasive as 'the claims of the testator's family members?
Presumably, the testator designated the non-relative as beneficiary
because she determined that the beneficiary was most entitled to the
testator's estate. It is likely that the testator-beneficiary relationship
was interdependent-based on trust and reciprocity. So why prefer
the competing claims of family members?
There are several reasons why a court might approach a will
contest with a (rebuttable) presumption that family members have
stronger reliance-based claims than non-family will beneficiaries.
First, most people are aware of the cultural norm of passing assets
intergenerationally within families and disinheriting only for cause.123
Thus, family members assume that if they are attentive and available,
they will inherit. Conversely, non-relatives also are aware of that
norm and would be less likely to expect (and thus to rely on) the
prospect of an inheritance from a close friend absent clearly
expressed declarations to that effect.
Moreover, standardized roles prescribe that basic support needs
will be met whenever possible by family members.12 4  Courts
121. Studies suggest that testators give greater proportions of their estate to children
who have provided significantly more parental care than their siblings and that childless
testators prefer those distant relatives with whom they have been close over those with
whom they have had infrequent contact. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 98-107;
Bernheim et al., supra note 68 (presenting econometric and other evidence that bequests
are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries).
122. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 84-86. There is also a normative
consensus that a testator is morally justified in disinheriting her closest relatives when the
testator has been abandoned or neglected by them. See id. at 110-11; see also
ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 90-94 (examining the gender and class make-up of
testators who disinherit close relatives). Interestingly, Rosenfeld establishes that
disinheritance occurs most frequently at the lower end of the economic scale, see
ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 90-94, a fact that highlights the importance of
disinheritance as a symbolic act of retribution.
123. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Part II.A.4.
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understand that family members may make great sacrifices on behalf
of each other without ever reducing the obligatory norm of
reciprocity to an express understanding. On the other hand, acts of
substantial support by non-relatives will be understood by the parties
as extraordinary-thus, the beneficiary of those acts might feel some
need to reciprocate immediately in some form or to make some
express statement articulating the duty to reciprocate. The non-
family member who performs extraordinary support functions will
likely do so because the satisfaction he experiences is its own reward,
or because he has an express understanding with the beneficiary, or
some combination of both. Thus, it would not be surprising if a non-
relative who provided primary care either was compensated during
the testator's life or reduced the testator's desire to reciprocate to an
express understanding, whereas we would not expect competing
family members to have behaved in that way. When a non-relative
claims to be entitled to the testator's estate, the sense that the non-
relative relied on an implied agreement, or that the testator benefited
from an implied agreement, is less believable initially than a similar
claim advanced by a close family member.
The only scenario in which a non-relative's expectation of a large
inheritance would be reasonable is when he has assumed the primary
supportive functions traditionally performed by family-in short,
when the testator-beneficiary relationship has become "familial" in
nature. In that case, the support provided by family members, if any,
is weak, as is the testator's relative trust in the familial relationship."z
In this instance, the non-relative beneficiary might be more likely to
harbor reasonable expectations of inheritance. First, cultural norms
tell him that the testator would be justified in disinheriting her closest
relatives. 26 Second, the relationship between potential testator and
non-relative beneficiary is extremely interdependent. As such, the
same rules that traditionally apply to family apply here: To honor
the intimacy of the relationship, the parties will be reluctant to
acknowledge expressly that reciprocity is a basis of the relationship
and any attempt to discuss or expressly memorialize implied
understandings would cheapen the relationship itself. In that
situation, the expectation of reciprocity is more reasonable, as is the
propensity to rely on implied agreements to abide by the reciprocity
125. See ROSENFELD, supra note 18, at 3, 112 (establishing that the incidents of extra-
familial bequests, vindictive disinheritance, and escheat were lowest in senior
communities when the residents maintained strong family ties and highest for recipients
of geriatric nursing care).
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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norm.
B. The Case Law
Because an extraordinarily high percentage of people devise
their estates to close family members, 2 7 in all but a small fraction of
estates cases there is no tension between honoring testator's intent
and honoring the reciprocity norm. The difficulty arises in those few
cases in which a court perceives that the testator has violated the
reciprocity norm by failing to satisfy the reasonable expectations of
family members. In those cases, I suggest, courts often disregard the
testator's intent and find some way to ensure that testator's estate is
distributed to family members perceived as deserving.'2
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. There are some factual situations in which the characterization of a disinherited
family member's claim as reliance-based is inaccurate because that family member would
have taken the same care of the testator even if she had known that he would ultimately
disinherit her. This would occur either when the disinherited family member is
predominately altruistic, when that member was adequately compensated during life
through return giving from the testator, or when the family member was "compensated"
by a sense of having fulfilled a duty incurred by previous giving acts by the testator.
If most family members would engage in giving behavior even knowing that they
would be disinherited, then what reason could there be for courts to view testators who
prefer non-relatives as owing obligations to family? After all, the family member did not
benefit the testator in reliance on receiving some future benefit, financial or otherwise,
and she formed no expectation of a further reward in the form of an inheritance.
First, family members who feel that the testator owed them no obligation are not
likely to end up in court fighting over a family member's estate. A pure altruist would
feel no disappointment at being disinherited, for he would have achieved satisfaction from
having acted altruistically in the past and would not have harbored expectations of being
compensated. Similarly, those who feel that they were well compensated during the
testator's life would have no motivation (except greed) for contesting a will. Of course,
we could expect even a pure altruist to feel emotionally distraught at the rejection, given
that disinheritance is often interpreted as a statement of indifference, hostility, or even
hate. Nevertheless, once the statement has been made, winning a will contest could not
lessen the altruist's feeling of rejection. So, the act of filing a will contest requires self-
interested motives-a feeling of dessert or entitlement. It seems safe to say that most
courts confronting will contests are dealing with contestants who feel entitled in large
measure to a significant portion of the testator's estate.
Notwithstanding all that, for the sake of argument imagine a family member who
contests the testator's will, not because she feels entitled to a portion of the estate but
because she wishes to honor the testator by ensuring that only the testator's final, clearly
expressed intentions are carried out (obviously, an extremely altruistic contestant). How
might a court view the relationship between the testator and the family member? The
point is that a court would have no real way of determining whether a contesting family
member is owed an obligation or whether the testator discharged that obligation during
life because wills doctrine precludes such an inquiry. Because doctrine insists on
conceptualizing inheritance as a unilateral act, which leads to a focus on the testator's
intent, the contestant cannot give voice (at least not directly) to issues of reciprocity
because that issue has been deemed irrelevant. Thus, to the extent the court considers
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Concern for the reciprocity norm is also revealed in cases in
which the testator's will prefers one or more of his closest relatives
over other equally close family members. Even here, we see that
courts often disregard the testator's clear intent when the
disinherited family member has a clear reciprocity-based claim.
The following sections develop the doctrinal argument.
Specifically, I examine two discrete areas of wills law-the doctrine
of undue influence and the formalities doctrine-to show how courts
manipulate doctrine to honor the reciprocity norm.
1. Undue Influence Law
Academics view the undue influence doctrine as the judicial
equivalent of silly putty.129 For years, scholars have accused courts of
manipulating the doctrine to achieve a variety of ends while ignoring
the testator's intent. For instance, some view the doctrine as simply a
thinly disguised rule of family preference-courts can use it to ensure
that the testator's property passes to blood relatives. 130  Others see
the doctrine as reflexively applied to punish those involved in
those issues, it does so intuitively. If a reciprocal relationship between the testator and
family members appeared to be functioning just prior to the testator's death, a court is
likely to presume that the testator incurred enforceable obligations, absent evidence to
the contrary.
129. A variety of scholars have struggled to make sense of the undue influence
doctrine by suggesting that it is merely a vehicle that enables judges to impose a variety of
subjective preferences. See, e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting
from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 200,208-12 (1989) (criticizing courts for using undue influence doctrine to
invalidate wills that benefit partners involved in "meretricious relationships"); Lawrence
A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do
with It?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 841, 843-58 (1996) (arguing that courts' use of undue
influence doctrine to prefer testators' closest relatives can be explained by the principles
of sociobiology); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571
(1997) (arguing that courts use the undue influence doctrine to deny testamentary
freedom for those who fail to provide for family members); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue
Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 225 (1981) (exploring the
extent to which courts use the undue influence doctrine to invalidate wills preferring
homosexual partners); Veena K. Murthy, Note, Undue Influence and Gender Stereotypes:
Legal Doctrine or Indoctrination?, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 105, 127-30 (1997) (arguing
that courts use the undue influence doctrine in a way that reinforces gender stereotypes);
see also Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1043, 1045-63 (1987) (exploring capacity doctrine and arguing that courts must
refer to common values in determining capacity and cannot simply determine the
testator's subjective intent).
130. See Madoff, supra note 129, at 577; see also Frolik, supra note 129, at 871-82
(using principles of sociobiology to explain courts' use of undue influence law to protect
the testator's family).
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relationships that the court views objectionable. 131 In my view, those
explanations are insufficiently nuanced. We can clarify those
explanations by examining the context of the family relationships in
particular cases.13 1
A survey of more than 160 cases within a five-year period 133
reveals that when a testator's will appears to fly in the face of the
reciprocity norm, courts commonly honor that norm by invalidating
the will, often by finding that the testator-beneficiary relationship
was "confidential" and created a presumption of undue influence.
Such findings often seem to violate the testator's clear intentions. 3 1
Conversely, when the court wishes to uphold the will, the court will
view an intimate interdependent relationship between a testator and
a will beneficiary as justifying the bequest, rather than giving rise to a
presumption of invalidity.135
Consider two recent cases in which courts upheld wills that
disinherited the testator's blood-relatives. In each case, the court
131. See deFuria, supra note 129, at 205-06; Madoff, supra note 129, at 586-92;
Sherman, supra note 129, at 227.
132. Even our understanding of cases that seem to reflect pure prejudice can be
enriched if we consider the reciprocity norm. For example, In re Will of Kauffman, 247
N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), is an infamous case that upheld the denial of probate to a
will leaving the testator's estate to his life partner. The contestant, the testator's brother,
enjoyed a solid relationship with the testator and provided for his needs for many years
prior to the testator's relationship with his companion. See id. at 666. In upholding the
undue influence finding, the court pointed to the testator-beneficiary relationship itself as
evidence of the testator's mental instability. See id. at 682-86. The court's holding
conformed to the reciprocity norm as the court saw it; the court's error was that it failed
to understand that the testator and beneficiary enjoyed a family relationship. Cf. Smith v.
Chatfield, 745 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (remanding the case to the jury for a
determination of whether the will leaving the bulk of a female attorney testator's estate to
the testator's boyfriend, instead of her niece, was procured by undue influence because
the niece and her aunt appeared to have a good relationship).
133. See Leslie, supra note 118, at 243; supra note 118 (describing the survey).
134. See, e.g., Birch v. Coleman, 691 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing a
lower court decision admitting a will to probate, where the will left the testator's entire
estate to the care-giver in whose home he resided, and emphasizing that the testator had
been close to the nephew-contestant and had treated him like a son); Gaines v. Frawley,
739 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ) (invalidating a will that gave the testator's
estate to her live-in boyfriend and disinherited her two adult sons and emphasizing that
the sons had been on good terms with the testator and had frequently visited her home).
135. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kern, 716 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Kan. 1986) (upholding a will
leaving the bulk of an estate to the testator's attorneys when the niece-contestant had not
visited the testator in 30 years, even when the testator was very ill); In re Estate of Swain,
509 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (App. Div. 1986) (setting aside a jury verdict of undue influence
when the testator's will left her estate to the daughter who had cared for her instead of
her son); Pace v. Richmond, 343 S.E.2d 59, 60 (Va. 1986) (validating the testator's will,
which left his estate to his neighbors and disinherited his nephews, when evidence showed
that the testator had been extremely distraught about treatment from his nephews).
[Vol. 77
ENFORCING FAMILY PROMISES
took pains to consider the quality of the family member-contestant's
relationship to the decedent and found no supportive relationship.
As a result, the courts viewed the testator as honoring the reciprocity
norm, and, in each case, the court upheld the will.
In In re Estate of Ambers,'136 the testator left his entire estate to a
couple who rented his farmland and named the wife as executor of
his estate. 37 In so doing, he disinherited his ten siblings, who
contested the will. 3 The case presented an unusual number of facts
generally viewed as indicative of undue influence. 39 Moreover, an
applicable statute could easily have been interpreted to place the
burden of proof on the will beneficiaries.140 Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the trial court's rejection of an undue influence claim,
noting that "George thought very highly of the Nelsons and reposed
a great deal of trust in them," that "the Nelsons provided much
helpful assistance to George over a period of many years," and that
"George and the Nelsons had a close, affectionate relationship."'' Of
course, the same could be said of any relationship that becomes the
subject of an undue influence claim.
Perhaps stronger evidence of the court's perspective is found'in a
footnote: The court noted that the contestants acknowledged at oral
argument that they rarely, if ever, visited the testator-the testator's
family members visited at a rate of one relative every three to six
months, and no one relative appears to have visited with any
frequency. 42 Thus, the relatives were not available to assist the
testator as his health declined. By comparison, the beneficiaries
visited regularly. 43 The court also quoted from the beneficiaries'
brief that when the attorney "asked George to whom of his relatives
he wanted to leave his property ... George started to weep and said,
'they never come to visit me.' , Moreover, the nurses at the home
136. 477 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1991).
137. See id. at 219-20.
138. See id. at 220.
139. The testator was elderly and executed the will shortly before his death while
living in a nursing home; the beneficiaries were the testator's tenants and leased the
testator's farmland for below market rates; the beneficiaries did not contact the testator's
relatives when it became necessary to move him to a nursing home; after the testator
moved to the nursing home, the beneficiaries obtained his power of attorney, made all
bank deposits, received his mail, stored his personal property, had the keys to his house,
and handled all of his financial affairs. See id. at 219-21.
140. See id. at 221-22 (interpreting N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-01-08, -01-16 (1985)).
141. Id. at 221.
142. See id. at 221 n.4.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 223.
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where George lived for the last two years of his life were unaware
that he had any family.45 The decision to probate the will can be
viewed as a determination that the heirs had no reciprocity-based
claims.
Similarly, in Estate of Sarabia,'146 a court validated the testator's
will leaving his entire estate to a male partner and business manager
with whom he had lived for many years, even though the beneficiary
had maintained complete control over the testator's financial affairs
and actively assisted in procuring the will. 147 In rejecting the undue
influence challenge of the testator's brother, the court determined
that the testator had been competent and had not been coerced. 141
Although the court's opinion should have stopped there, the opinion
continued at length, emphasizing the contestant brother's lack of a
reasonable expectation of inheritance:
"[T]his is not the case of an 'unnatural will' where
dependents and those who had grown accustomed to lean
upon the bounty of one are, at the death of that person,
without apparent reason, deprived by his will of that bounty.
Nor is it a will where relations, intimate in fact as well as in
blood, who have had a reasonable basis for their
'expectations' have been disappointed at the expression of
the testator.' 149
In both Ambers and Sarabia, the courts recognized the norm of
reciprocity: reliance on inheritance is reasonable only when the
testator and family members have been engaged in a trust-based
reciprocal relationship. 50 Because relatives had not provided a safety
net, their claims were weak. They had not conferred benefits on the
testator, and their absence from his life demonstrated that they in
fact had not relied on the hope of an inheritance.
Now, compare recent undue influence cases in which family
members were involved in the testator's life and appeared to be
available to provide support. In In re Estate of Strozzi,151 the testator
145. See id.
146. 270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1990).
147. See id. at 561-62.
148. See id. at 563.
149. Id. at 565 (quoting In re Dolbeer's Estate, 86 P. 695, 698 (Cal. 1906)).
150. Other courts have also recognized the norm. See In re Estate of Kern, 716 P.2d
528, 530 (Kan. 1986) (noting that the testator "felt closer to [the beneficiaries] than to her
relatives" and that the contestant did not have any contact with the testator for 30 years);
In re Estate of Gearin, 517 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (App. Div. 1987) (stating that "it cannot be
said [testator's] ... choice of beneficiaries was strange or unreasonable").
151. 903 P.2d 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
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devised his million-dollar ranch to two women to whom he was
tangentially related by his sister's marriage. Prior to executing his
will, the unmarried testator had fallen upon hard times,15 and the
beneficiaries had moved into a trailer next door to attend to his
needs.153 From then until the day the testator died, the beneficiaries
met all of his basic needs-they cleaned, cooked, and generally cared
for him on a daily basis for several years until his death.5 a
Nevertheless, the court did not view the testator's disposition of
his ranch to the women as justifiable. In the court's view, the facts
established a "confidential" relationship and a corresponding
presumption of invalidity.55 In justifying that result, the court stated:
Perhaps the strongest corroborative evidence of a
confidential relationship is [the beneficiaries'] own
testimony regarding their continual presence at [the
testator's] house and in all aspects of [the testator's] life in
the days, months, and years after [the testator's brother's]
death.... [The testator] confirmed the underpinnings of a
confidential relationship when he stated at his deposition
during conservatorship proceedings that [the beneficiaries]
were the "best neighbors that I had" and that the
[beneficiaries] "do honest work. I trust them."'156
Thus, the same type of evidence that the Ambers court interpreted as
rebutting a charge of undue influence was treated by the Strozzi court
as suspicious enough to create a presumption of undue influence.
Why did the court not view the will as a final act of reciprocity in
a trust-based relationship? In the court's view, the amount given was
undue compensation for services rendered by the beneficiaries: "A
[one] million [dollar] ranch estate is an extraordinary amount of
consideration for the work Respondents performed over only the last
few years of Strozzi's life."'5 7 It also appeared that the testator's
closest relatives were involved in his life and were available to
provide support. For example, his grandnephew had at one point
instigated conservatorship proceedings. 58
It is clear that the court did not focus on the facts regarding the
will's execution, including whether the testator was competent or
152. The testator's brother had died, and shortly thereafter the testator injured himself
in a fall. See id. at 853.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 855-56.
156. Id. at 856.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 853.
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
coerced, all of which should have been relevant given that the issue
was whether the jury's decision was against the weight of the
evidence. Not only was there no evidence of coercion, but there was
ample reason to think that the testator wanted to prefer those who
cared for him. Most notably, he had objected to the grandnephew's
commencement of guardianship proceedings, which ended in a
stipulation that the testator was mentally competent.159 Although
there was evidence that the testator had mental handicaps, there was
no evidence that the testator lacked capacity or was otherwise
susceptible to undue influence.60 One could reasonably infer that he
preferred the care he received from the beneficiaries to the attention
he received from his blood relatives. The facts do not support the
finding that the will did not reflect the testator's intent.
In Strozzi, the issue before the court was whether the jury's
verdict was against the weight of the evidence-thus, even under the
traditional, testator-focused view of wills law, the court had some
legitimate basis for upholding the jury's verdict. In In re Estate of
Smith, 6' however, the court went much farther, reversing under de
novo review the trial court's determination that the contested will
was valid. There is no doubt that the testator appeared to be a
strong-willed, passionate, and extremely difficult woman given to
extremes in behavior. 62 The contest involved the testator's adult son,
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. 862 P.2d 509 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
162 See id at 515. It certainly appears that the testator had a volatile and somewhat
paranoid personality; at various times she accused her boyfriend of stealing from her, and
she made the same allegations at other times regarding her son and his wife. See id. at
513. She had serious breaks at various times with both her son and her boyfriend and at
various times accused her son or her boyfriend of "trying to kill her." Id. There is
evidence that she had harbored animosity toward her son's wife for quite some time prior
to coming to live with them. Both relationships appeared to involve a substantial amount
of fighting. See id.
Three years before she died, the testator and her boyfriend split up because he was
drinking. According to her son, she asked her son for help in getting her boyfriend out of
the house. As a consequence, her son instigated guardianship proceedings and, after he
was named guardian, began eviction proceedings. The testator then went to live with her
son. During this time, she visited an attorney and stated that she did not want to leave
any of her estate to her boyfriend and used language that indicated she was quite angry
with him. She then executed a will leaving her entire estate to her son. By her son's
admission, she experienced periods of memory loss during this time and sometimes
appeared confused. See id. at 513-14.
Shortly thereafter, the testator and her boyfriend reconciled. After spending a
weekend together, the testator determined that she wanted her boyfriend to be her
guardian and decided to move back in with him. At this point, she turned on her son (just
as she had previously turned on her boyfriend), deciding that he was only after her
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the contestant, and the testator's boyfriend of eleven years, the will's
sole beneficiary. The testator apparently fought frequently with her
son and her boyfriend and harbored an intense dislike for her son's
wife.'63 She had at least one serious falling out with her boyfriend
and one with her son. Her affection fluctuated between them.164 She
wrote several wills that mirrored her changing preferences and
vendettas. Her final will left her entire estate to her boyfriend and
disinherited her son.65 The trial court found that there was no undue
influence involved in the procurement or execution of that will and
admitted it to probate. 66
The appellate court reversed in an opinion that stretched the
concept of undue influence to new limits. The court held that the will
was a product of undue influence even though it reflected
testamentary intent. According to the court, the proper focus of the
inquiry did not concern the testator's intent, but "'the unfairness of
the advantage which is reaped as the result of wrongful conduct.' "167
The court elaborated: "'"Undue influence does not negative
consent by the donor. Equity acts because there is want of conscience
on the part of the donee, not want of consent on the part of the
donor." ' ,168 Instead of considering whether there was any
reasonable evidence to support the lower court's determination, the
court combed the record and highlighted any fact that would support
a finding of undue influence. Although credibility usually cannot be
evaluated on a cold record, the appellate court adopted the son's
version of events and ridiculed and dismissed the beneficiary's
testimony. 69 Even so, the court conceded that there was insufficient
evidence to infer that the boyfriend coerced the testator or actively
procured the will in his favor. 7 Nevertheless, the court determined
that the will was the result of undue influence because the beneficiary
money. Shortly thereafter, she wrote a will leaving her estate to her boyfriend. See id. at
514. For the next two years, the boyfriend lived with the testator and served as her
guardian. The testator had periods in which she refused to be left alone and so the
boyfriend would spend "24 hours a day" with her. Id. at 515. Eventually, the son, who
had not spoken to his mother since the guardianship proceedings, resumed contact,
visiting her in the hospital while she recovered from a knee operation. See id. at 511-15.
163. See id. at 511-15.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 511.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 518 (quoting In re Estate of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 890 (Or. 1958)).
168. Id. (quoting Reddaway, 329 P.2d at 890 (quoting 3 MODERN L. REV. 97, 100
(1939))) (emphasis in Reddaway).
169. See id. at 515-18.
170. See id. at 516.
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used his confidential relationship with the testator to "dominate"
her.171 The court admitted that the testator was a strong-willed
woman but justified its finding of the beneficiary's "dominance" by
redefining the word: "[A] finding of dominance does not require
evidence that an authoritative, controlling person bullied or directed
the actions of a subservient one. Dominance can be expressed more
subtly, such as by suggestion or persuasion or by fostering a sense of
need and dependence."''
Under Oregon law, the court could not shift the burden to the
will's beneficiary unless it also recognized "suspicious
circumstances."'7 3 It determined the requisite grounds for suspicion
in the terms of the will itself.74 According to the court, "an
apparently unfair gift, such as one that disregards the natural objects
of the testator's bounty, is an indication of undue influence.... [The
testator's] will resulted in 'shunting the property away from those
who had a reasonable expectation of being the recipients of the
donor's bounty,' " and therefore, the court stated, "is at least a
suspicious circumstance."' 7 5 Thus, the court concluded, the testator
and beneficiary had enjoyed a "confidential relationship" that
created a presumption of undue influence that the beneficiary could
not overcome. 7
6
The Smith court forthrightly enforced compliance with the
family reciprocity norm at the expense of effectuating the testator's
intent. The testator's son had a reasonable expectation of inheritance
on which he seemed to have relied; he had been a beneficiary in his
mother's previous wills, had provided a great deal of emotional
support in times of crises, and had weathered a fair amount of
emotional abuse. On the other hand, the court emphasized that the
boyfriend had no entitlement to the inheritance: The court
belabored (as though it were relevant) the fact that when the
boyfriend left his second wife to live with the testator, he brought no
assets with him; that he never paid rent to the testator; that the
evidence was "conflicting" regarding "what financial contributions, if
any, he made to the relationship"; that he was sporadically employed;
171. See id. at 515.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 516-17 (emphasizing both the fact that the will departed from the
testator's prior testamentary scheme, which gave one-third of her estate to her son and
one-third to her boyfriend, as well as the fact that the court viewed the final disposition as
"unnatural or unjust").
175. Id. at 517 (quoting In re Estate of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 893 (Or. 1958)).
176. See id. at 518.
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that he drank; and that he reneged on a promise to designate the
testator as the sole beneficiary of his will because he added four
specific bequests to others.'7 Thus, the court implied, the beneficiary
received ample benefits from the testator during her life and
therefore had no further entitlement to her estate.
If the court had been concerned with determining whether the
will truly represented the testator's intent, it could have recognized
ample evidence to support the lower court's verdict supporting the
will. The testator and the beneficiary had lived together for eleven
years, and he had nursed her for a six-year period while she
recovered from two hip-replacement surgeries and two cataract
operations. 78 She had previously benefited him in other wills,
disinheriting him only once during a brief separation.1 79  By all
accounts, the testator was dependent on her boyfriend for the
fulfillment of all of her needs. Towards the end of her life, she did
not wish to be left alone at all.' The beneficiary continued to live
with and care for the testator during the years after she had made her
final will, even when her demands were extraordinary. 8' The
testator's intent was a casualty of the Smith court's decision to
support the reciprocity norm.' 2
177. Id. at 511-12.
178. See id. at 509-11.
179. See id. at 512-15.
180. See id. at 515.
181. See id.
182. The treatment by courts of undue influence claims in intrafamily contexts gives
added support to my thesis. Courts routinely determine that children who take care of
parents-often exercising control over all aspects of their lives, including medical care,
financial affairs, and making their major decisions-are deserving of favoritism and either
refuse to label the relationship "confidential," or, more frequently, admit that it was
confidential but nevertheless do not impose a presumption of undue influence.
Conversely, courts will invalidate wills that disinherit children who have been available
and supportive of their parents. For example, in In re Estate of Tipp, 933 P.2d 182 (Mont.
1997), the court upheld the lower court's rejection of an undue influence claim brought by
one of the testator's daughters, when the will left the testator's house to another daughter,
Sylvia, who had cared for her mother after she was diagnosed with cancer and broke a
hip. The court admitted that Sylvia and her mother shared a confidential relationship,
and that due to the testator's weakened mental condition, Sylvia had had the opportunity
to exercise undue influence. See id at 184-85. The contestant also proved that the
testator depended entirely upon Sylvia to manage her finances and for transportation, and
the testator's first will had treated her children equally. See id. at 185-86. The contestant
alleged that the testator had changed her will in response to Sylvia's threat to
institutionalize her if she did not and emphasized that Sylvia had twice driven her mother
to her attorney's office for the purpose of changing the will. See id. at 183, 186. In
rejecting the claim of undue influence, the court emphasized evidence that showed that
the testator and Sylvia had become "increasingly close" and that the will could be
understood as the testator's expression of gratitude for Sylvia's care. Id. at 186. Perhaps
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2. Formalities
Although the principal objective of will formalities is to ensure
that a document offered for probate embodies the testator's final
intentions, 83 will formalities statutes do not expressly direct courts to
consider the testator's intention."8 Rather, courts must simply
ensure that the proffered will complies with formalities.18 5
Commentators have worried that courts have approached this task
rather too formalistically-that documents intended by their drafters
to be wills too often are denied probate for some trifling
technicality.'86 Some courts have responded to those scholars'
more importantly, the court highlighted the testimony of the testator's hospice worker
that the testator had desired to stay in her home as she suffered from cancer and that the
testator and Sylvia had made an agreement that the testator would "leav[e] her home to
Sylvia in exchange for taking care of her until she died, whether it was tomorrow or, you
know, five years from now." Id. The court also pointed to evidence that the testator's
other children had refused to care for her in the way she had requested. See id.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the will was not "unnatural." Id.
183. See, e.g., Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 1, at 3 (restating the
accepted wisdom that formalities are justified on functional grounds because they ensure
implementation of the testator's final, deliberate intentions).
184. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1998) (dictating
the requirements for a validly executed will).
185. See id.
186. John Langbein laments that courts void potential wills for "[t]he most minute
defect in formal compliance ... no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was
inconsequential." Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 1, at 489. Professor
Bruce Mann states that "[c]ourts have routinely invalidated wills for minor defects in
form even in uncontested cases and sometimes even while conceding-always ruefully, of
course-that the document clearly represents the wishes and intent of the testator."
Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033, 1036 (1994). Indeed, a review of writings on this subject shows that the
dominant theme of estates law scholarship in the last few decades is the threat that
formalism allegedly poses to testamentary freedom. See Jane B. Baron, Intention,
Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DuKE L.J. 630, 635 (1992) ("Unfortunately, as has long
been recognized, the doctrines created to serve the testator's wishes have the potential to
undercut them. Will execution requirements ... may deny effect to wishes due to minor
defects in form."); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Form and Formalism: A Case Study, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 649-51 (1983); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 1, at 17-18 (noting that
"[d]octrinal barriers to the effectuation of intent are raised most frequently by the
requirements of the statutes of wills" and arguing for a substantial performance approach
to will construction); J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities for
Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. B. ASS'N J., Winter 1992, at 10, 13 (recommending that
the Virginia legislature pass a dispensing power statute); Lindgren, supra note 1, at 546
(arguing that attestation requirements should be abolished because "[t]he law should set
requirements at a level that tends to enforce the testator's intent, not frustrate it"); James
Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1992) (arguing for an even
greater reduction of formalities than are present in the revised UPC because "when
formalism falls, intent rises"); Mann, supra note 1, at 39 (criticizing courts for "routinely
invalidat[ing] wills because of minor defects in execution, even when no one questions
that the will represents the wishes and intent of the testator"); J.K. Maxton, Execution of
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concerns by announcing that they will validate wills that
"substantially comply" with formalities when testators' intent is clear
and convincing.'l 7 Toward the same end, scholars recently drafted
Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 (known colloquially as the
"dispensing power"), which would authorize courts to excuse non-
compliance with formalities so long as evidence that the document
was intended to operate as the testator's will is clear and
convincing."8 The dispensing power has been adopted in only a few
states to date.8 9  Scholars have predicted that the substantial
compliance doctrine and statutory dispensing powers will
substantially reduce judicial rejection of wills for trivial defects and
will result in the validation of a greater number of wills. 9'
Probate courts, however, have not been as obsessed by
Wills: The Formalities Considered, 1 CANTERBURY L. REV. 393,412-14 (1982); Charles I.
Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution
of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REv. 331, 354-57 (1979) (criticizing strict construction and advocating
their own statutory solution that would allow courts more discretion in validating wills);
Rosemary Tobin, The Wills Act Formalities: A Need for Reform, 1991 N.Z. L.J. 191
(arguing for the adoption of the dispensing power in New Zealand to ensure effectuation
of testamentary intent); Lydia A. Clougherty, Note, An Analysis of the National Advisory
Committee on Uniform State Laws' Recommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities,
10 PROB. L.J. 283, 283-84 (1991) (suggesting new execution requirements to minimize the
"risk of frustrating the testator's intent"); Kelly A. Hardin, Note, An Analysis of the
Virginia Wills Act Formalities and a Need for a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145, 1178-81 (1993) (arguing that the dispensing power is
necessary to effectuate testamentary intent); Melissa Webb, Note, Wich v. Fleming: The
Dilemma of a Harmless Defect in a Will, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 904 (1983) (urging the
legislature of Texas to adopt a substantial compliance statute governing will
construction); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 33.1 cmt. g (1992) (noting that law reform organizations, some legislatures, and
commentators support the use of a harmless error rule and recommending the use of the
substantial compliance doctrine). See generally Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors,
supra note 1, at 51-54 (arguing for adoption of the dispensing power).
187. See, e.g., In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1343 (N.J. 1991); see also Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 1, at 531 (urging courts to adopt the substantial
compliance doctrine in will formalities disputes).
188. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 146 (Supp. 1998);
see also Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 1, at 51-54 (arguing for the
adoption of the dispensing power).
189. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-503 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (1997);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (Michie 1997).
190. For example, James Lindgren predicts that "[t]his new standard will change the
outcome of the majority of cases involving will execution errors." Lindgren, supra note
186, at 1016. Professor Bruce Mann believes that the dispensing power will "restore[] a
measure of candor to the process of determining the formal sufficiency of testamentary
writings." Mann, supra note 186, at 1040. Langbein predicts that "[t]he cruelty of the old
law" will disappear and testamentary freedom will presumably reign supreme. Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 1, at 1.
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formalities as these scholars suggest.' As far back as the turn of the
last century, some courts were willing to excuse less than strict
compliance with will formalities. 192  Even within the same
jurisdiction, judicial commitment to strict construction has ebbed and
flowed noticeably.'93 Moreover, even in jurisdictions with no
precedential support for substantial compliance, courts have achieved
the same result by heroically stretching to recognize compliance.'94
The "problem," such as it is, is not simply that a number of judges are
overly formalistic. Rather, the constant flux of formalities law is, in
considerable measure, a product of the judicial struggle to support
the reciprocity norm.
Admittedly, formalities cases are difficult to analyze for my
purposes. Because the "official" objective is merely to ascertain
whether the will was properly executed, most opinions leave out facts
that are important to my analysis. Often, we know little more than
the identity of the parties to the contest. Nevertheless, the little
evidence we do have suggests that courts are mindful of reciprocity,
and that the identity of the beneficiary, the quality of the relationship
between testator and beneficiary, and the quality of the relationship
between testator and contestant continue to influence courts'
willingness to allow less than strict compliance with formalities. That
is, courts require strict adherence to formalities, so long as doing so
does not violate social norms that compete with free testation.'95 At
the same time, courts are more willing to stretch formalities or allow
substantial compliance when doing so better honors those norms.196
191. See Leslie, supra note 118, at 258-68.
192. See id. at 262-64 & n.120.
193. See id. at 260-62 (discussing Texas law and the "witness presence" requirement);
id. at 264-65 (discussing Michigan law, the "witness presence" requirement, and the
substantial compliance doctrine); id. at 266 (discussing Illinois law and the signature
requirement).
194. See, e.g., id. at 261-63 (discussing Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
195. See id. at 258-68.
196. See id. For example, even though Michigan's highest court applied the
"substantial compliance" approach to wills formalities beginning in 1890, see Cook v.
Winchester, 46 N.W. 106, 109 (Mich. 1890); In re Lane's Estate, 251 N.W. 590, 593 (Mich.
1933), two later cases, see In re Estate of Hill, 84 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Mich. 1957); In re
Cytacki's Estate, 292 N.W. 489, 490-91 (Mich. 1940), disregarded that precedent, striking
down wills for failing to strictly comply with the requirement that witnesses sign in the
same room as the testator. In both Cook and Lane, the court upheld wills when the
witnesses had signed well out of the testator's presence: In Cook, a witness signed the will
in a separate room of the house, and the court conceded it had been "physically
impossible" for the testator to see the witness. Cook, 46 N.W. at 107. In Lane, a witness
signed in the corridor of a hospital, 30 feet from the testator's hospital room. See Lane,
251 N.W. at 591. Notwithstanding this precedent, courts in two later cases with
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substantially similar facts demanded strict adherence to the presence requirement and
invalidated wills, even though neither case raised an inference of fraud. See Hill, 84
N.W.2d at 461 (invalidating a will because one witness signed in a room next to testator);
Cytacki, 292 N.W. at 490-91 (invalidating a will when the witness signed it in a house next
door, nine feet away). In both later cases, the disinherited contestant was the testator's
mother. See Hill, 84 N.W.2d at 459; Cytacki, 292 N.W. at 490. In striking down the wills
to provide for the testators' mothers, the courts disregarded the testators' intentions. By
invoking the necessity of strict compliance, they were able to justify doing so, because
intent has no place in the analysis. For an extended discussion of this line of Michigan
cases, see Leslie, supra note 118, at 264-65.
In In re Demaris' Estate, 110 P.2d 571 (Or. 1941), the Oregon Supreme Court
determined that the witness presence test was met when witnesses had signed the will out
of the testator's sight in a room located several rooms away from where the testator was
located. Here, the court's concern for fairness as informed by the reciprocity norm was
clear: The testator's will devised his entire estate to his sister Ida, whom the court
characterized as having treated the testator "throughout her entire life ... [with] tireless
devotion." Id. at 578. Failure to validate the testator's will would have been disastrous
for Ida. Under the intestacy statutes, the testator's entire estate would have been
distributed to the testator's father's estate (the father had briefly outlived the testator).
See id. at 573. Father and Ida were estranged, and his will disinherited her. See id. It is
clear that the court's willingness to embrace wholeheartedly the doctrine of substantial
compliance was motivated by its view of Ida as deserving:
It is true that her brother and sisters are honest, industrious and splendid law-
abiding citizens; but in sickness and distress, in good times and bad, she was the
one who was always ready to sacrifice her own time and energy, whenever the
testator, her brother, needed help. When he was sick, no matter where she
might be, she was the one who was called upon to return, and care for him.
Freely and gladly she answered the call and nursed him back to health.... [The
testator] chose the honorable course, and it was only to be expected, that when
he was stricken, and on his death-bed, and no doubt with a foreboding that he
was approaching the end, his thoughts should turn towards his sister, who had
been so unselfish and devoted to him.
Id. at 579. The fact that the court included that -stirring account of the testator's
relationship with his sister, despite its supposed irrelevance, indicates that the court found
justification for its departure from strict construction because it viewed the sister as
deserving. The key to the case is not that the court was determined to effect the testator's
intent, but that it was determined to effect the testator's intent because it was in
accordance with social norms.
Other "witness presence" cases reinforce the inference raised by the Michigan and
Oregon cases. See, e.g., In re Tracy's Estate, 182 P.2d 336, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)
(following Demaris in recognizing a valid revocation of a will in favor of a third party
even though the witnesses signed in a different room, resulting in the distribution of the
testator's estate to her husband); In re Estate of Weber, 387 P.2d 165, 166-68, 170 (Kan.
1963) (disregarding precedent stating that substantial compliance with formalities was
sufficient and holding a will invalid when witnesses signed inside a bank and could see the
testator, who remained in a car, through the window but could not hear him; the invalid
will had mistakenly left the testator's entire estate to his niece, though the testator had
meant to leave half to his niece and half to his incompetent wife-invalidation of the will
passed the entire estate to his wife); In re Will of Pridgen, 249 N.C. 509, 510-12, 516, 107
S.E.2d 160, 161-62, 165 (1959) (recognizing a will leaving an entire estate to the testator's
wife as properly executed, even though a witness admittedly signed the will in an
adjoining room out of the testator's sight, when rejection of the will would have required
the testator's wife to share the estate with the testator's two sisters and eight nephews and
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Neither the growing acceptance of the substantial compliance
doctrine nor enactments of the dispensing power has changed the
way courts approach wills cases. Rather, those devices have made it
easier for courts to enforce compliance with the reciprocity norm.
When the testator's intent accords with the norm, a court will
validate the will. But when a will appears to disappoint the reliance-
based expectations of family members, a court will be likely to
invalidate it on the ground that the defective document does not
represent the testator's true intent.
Two recent cases, Draper v. Pauley'9' and In re Estate of
Brooks'98 are illustrative. In Draper, the court invoked the
substantial compliance doctrine to validate a will that fulfilled the
testator's reciprocally-based obligations. In Brooks, the court could
have validated a will with similar defects by applying the state's
recently enacted dispensing power statute. Instead, the court
invalidated the will, and the testator's estate was distributed in equal
shares to her children, both of whom had active relationships with the
testator.
In Draper, the elderly testator had lived with her niece, Patricia
Pauley, and her family for a number of years.' 99 The niece took care
of her aunt's needs. During the last year of the testator's life, she was
hospitalized20 When Pauley visited her at the hospital, the testator
stated that she wanted to make out a will.20 She called into her room
a hospital employee who was also a notary.20 First, the testator
signed two pieces of blank paper and had the notary notarize her
signature. 203 Then, the testator handed the blank, signed sheets to
Pauley and dictated that upon her death Pauley should have the
house. °4 When Pauley finished writing, she read it back to the
testator, who stated that the document was exactly as she wanted it.
Another visitor then signed her name next to the notary public's
signature.25  Thus, the document contained the signatures of the
nieces); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 164-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(determining that a document forgiving the testator's brother's debt to the testator did
not substantially comply with formalities, when giving effect to the document would have
deprived the testator's wife and children of estate assets).
197. 480 S.E.2d 495 (Va. 1997).
198. 927 P.2d 1024 (Mont. 1996).









testator and the notary, both of which were affixed prior to the
drafting of the dispositive provisions of the will, and the signature of
only one witness.
At the testator's death, Pauley offered the will for probate. The
will was contested by the testator's two sons, who attacked the will as
invalid for failure to comply with formalities.20 6 The sons argued that
the notary's signature could not satisfy the attestation requirement
because it was affixed to the paper before it was a will. Because there
was only one witness, they argued, the will could not be admitted to
probate.
In affirming the trial court's admission of the will, the Virginia
Supreme Court emphasized that the wills statute "is not intended to
place restraints on the power to execute a will but to guard and
protect that power. It should not be interpreted in a manner which
imposes unnecessary difficulties that adversely affect the ability to
exercise the power. ' 2°7 First, the court held that the testator's name
was intended to be a signature, even though it was affixed prior to the
will's drafting."' Then, invoking the doctrine of substantial
compliance, the court held that Pauley's name, written by Pauley in
the text describing Pauley as the beneficiary, could be counted as a
witness signature.20 9 Thus, the will was admitted to probate and the
testator's sons went home empty-handed.
Draper is clearly a case in which a court was willing to struggle to
uphold the will, whatever the doctrinal obstacles. First, the evidence
gives rise to a strong inference that the testator intended that her
niece have the house. Perhaps more importantly, her niece deserved
it. The testator and her niece had a close, trust-based relationship
upon which they had both relied. Pauley gave thirty years of support
to the testator in reliance on that relationship. Moreover, Pauley also
cared for the testator's retarded brother for the same length of time,
and she continued to take care of him after the testator's death.210 In
contrast, the testator's sons had abandoned her"' and could not, by





210. See Brief of Appellee at 1-3, Draper v. Pauley, 480 S.E.2d 495 (Va. 1997) (No.
960761).
211. As the first paragraph of the "Statement of Facts" section of the beneficiary's
appellate brief emphasizes, the testator had lived with the beneficiary for 30 years and
had seen her sons no more than five times during that entire period, nor had she spoken
to them on the telephone. See id. at 1.
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expectation of inheritance or taken actions in reasonable reliance on
the prospect of inheritance. Given the equities of the case, the court
would have strained to reach the same result if it had arisen fifty
years earlier.
By contrast, in In re Estate of Brooks,212 the Montana Supreme
Court refused to invoke that state's dispensing power to save a will
when probating the will would have disappointed a disinherited
child's reasonable reciprocity-based expectations. In Brooks, the
court upheld the trial court's denial of probate of Kay Brooks's will
because it had only one witness signature. The facts regarding the
will's execution are strikingly similar to those in Draper. The will's
primary beneficiary drafted the will as the testator dictated it, and a
mutual friend served as witness. 213 The wills in both Draper and
Brooks had the signature of only one witness and of a notary who
could not properly qualify as a required second witness. While the
notary in Draper failed to qualify as a witness because she notarized
the testator's signature before the will was drafted, the notary in
Brooks could not serve as a witness because she notarized the
testator's signature at the beneficiary's request and outside the
testator's presence. The court so held despite the fact that the notary
had known the testator for thirty years, knew her signature well, and
thus felt comfortable notarizing testator's signature at the request of
testator's son.214  As a matter of formalities, the only significant
distinction between the cases was that the beneficiary in Brooks later
typed the will and thus deprived himself of the argument that his
name in the body of the will served as a witness signature. 15
Montana is one of the few states to have enacted a version of the
dispensing power.1 6 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court did not have
to consider whether the will "substantially complied" with
formalities. Rather, the court was authorized to overlook completely
non-compliance with one or more formalities, so long as the will's
proponent proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the testator
intended that the document be her will.21 7
The Brooks court refused to invoke the dispensing power. The
court first determined that the dispensing power put the burden on
212. 927 P.2d 1024 (Mont. 1996).
213. See id. at 1025.
214. See id. at 1025-26.
215. See id.
216. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (1997); see also supra note 189 (listing states
that have enacted the dispensing power).
217. See Brooks, 927 P.2d at 1027 (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523).
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the will's proponent to prove intent by clear and convincing evidence.
The court then held that the beneficiary failed to meet that burden
because he could not prove to the court's satisfaction that the testator
had testamentary capacity.218 Although the beneficiary had had the
foresight to tape his drafting session with the testator, the tapes
ultimately worked against him-the court found sufficient evidence
of lack of capacity in the following exchange:
[Son-beneficiary]: You own stock in Ford Motor Company
and stock in Australia New Zealand Bank.
Testator: I do? (laughs).219
When asked how she wanted to "handle" this stock, testator stated:
"I am no good at that kind of thing. I have no idea."' 0 Her will also
directed that certain personal property be given to her daughter's
family, even though she had already given it to them. From this, the
court concluded that "Kay 'did not know what property she had and
which would be disposed of by her will.' "21 In addition, her doctor
had noticed that over the past year she had become increasingly more
forgetful.'
The key distinction between Draper and Brooks concerns the
quality of the relationships between the testator and the child-
contestant. In Brooks, the testator's daughter by all accounts seemed
dutiful.' Although she lived in Washington state, the daughter
brought her mother to live with her for a one-year period following
her father's death and for intervals thereafter.1 4 The court noted
that after the testator was placed in a nursing home in Montana, the
daughter-contestant drove once a month from Spokane to visit her
mother.' Thus, the daughter had made substantial sacrifices to
benefit her sick mother.
There is good reason to think, however, that the testator meant
to leave her home only to her son rather than to confer joint
ownership on both children. First, her son lived with her for most of
218. See id. at 1029.
219. Id. at 1028.
220. 1&
221. Id. (quoting the lower court record).
222- See id. The court's capacity analysis in Brooks stands in marked contrast with
that found in In re Estate of Bodin, 398 P.2d 616 (Mont. 1965), in which the Montana
Supreme Court rejected a lack of capacity challenge to a will, despite evidence showing
that the 79-year-old testator was sick, in pain, and under the influence of medication,
which left her confused, forgetful, and uncommunicative. See id. at 619, 621.
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his adult life and continued to live in his mother's home after his
mother went to the nursing home.2 6 The mother might reasonably
have wanted him to be able to continue to live in the home without
dealing with a co-tenant. Most significantly, the court cryptically
alluded to a disagreement between son and daughter about the
"disposition of the family home," which had resulted in ill feelings
between the siblings. 7 It was thus entirely possible that the testator
thought a co-tenancy arrangement would not work. Moreover, the
facts indicate that the son was quite attentive, although his business
called him out of town with some frequency. In fact, the son visited
his mother in the nursing home every single day when he was not out
of town on business.' Additionally, it is clear that the testator did
provide for her daughter to some degree, although the court's
opinion neglects to give specifics.229 As a result of the court's
decision, the siblings received equal interests in the family home.
Draper and Brooks, taken together, suggest that the best
predictor in formalities cases is the quality of the relationship
between the testator and the contestant. Moreover, these cases are
not aberrational 3 0 A much broader survey of the case law would
lead to the same conclusion.231 When the contestant has acted in
accordance with social norms, providing care and services to the
testator, and can be viewed as having a claim akin to reliance, the
court is more likely to invalidate the will.
IV. RECIPROCITY AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
Courts considering wills cases support and reinforce the norms
governing social relationships. They implicitly reject a view of
testamentary transfers as unilateral. Rather, testamentary transfers




229. See id. Strangely, the court mentioned that the testator previously had executed a
will, but did not indicate what the provisions of that will were; it also neglected to
distribute the estate in accordance with that will after denying probate to the second will,
instead passing the property via intestacy. See id.
230. See, e.g., In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1340-45 (N.J. 1991) (applying the
substantial compliance doctrine to validate a will when witnesses had signed only the self-
proving affidavit; the will divided the estate between testator's children from his first
marriage, his second wife, and various charities); In re Estate of Voeller, 534 N.W.2d 24,
26 (N.D. 1995) (rejecting the argument that a will with one witness "substantially
complie[d]" with the wills statute, when the will left a large share of the estate to a
neighbor to the detriment of the testator's five children).
231. See, e.g., supra note 196 (discussing cases).
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interdependent relationship founded on trust.
It should not strike us as unusual that courts take this approach,
for it mirrors the approach that courts take to relational contracts in
business settings. A review of the current state of contracts law
shows that, in this area, courts have rejected a bright-line distinction
between gift and exchange, and that they support existing norms by
enforcing gratuitous promises, often without proof of reliance.,,2 In
contracts law, as well as in wills law, courts understand that the more
interdependent the relationship, the less likely are the parties to spell
out and expressly agree upon the shifting obligations and benefits of
their relationship. The norms of the relationship, interpreted against
the backdrop of relevant societal norms, inform the parties'
understanding of their agreement. Often, promises that, considered
in isolation, might be termed "gratuitous" can be seen as exchange-
based when considered in context. The "exchange" is not the
prototypical discrete transaction; rather, the promise is made in
furtherance of a reciprocal, long-term, trust-based relationship from
which the promisor will later derive benefits.
A survey of recent contracts scholarship reveals strong evidence
that courts are increasingly willing to enforce such "gratuitous"
promises when those promises are grounded in reciprocity. Scholars
argue that "gratuitous" promises invoke reciprocity in two ways.
First, promisors often obtain benefits from the very act of promising.
Second, promises often serve to initiate or fortify mutually beneficial
long-term relationships.
Andrew Kull has argued that courts often enforce purely
gratuitous express promises, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary,
even when the promisee cannot prove consideration, detrimental
reliance, or unjust enrichment.23  Professor Kull argues that
232. See infra text accompanying notes 250-90.
233. See Kull, supra note 5, at 40-46. Professors Yorio and Thel also demonstrate that
courts enforce gratuitous promises even absent reliance, although they cite this
phenomenon as evidence that the promissory basis of contracts law continues to thrive.
See Yorio & Thel, supra note 9, at 114-15. An integral theme of the arguments both of
Kull and of Yorio and Thel is that courts enforce only those gratuitous promises that are
clearly made and seriously intended. See Kull, supra note 5, at 43-44; Yorio & Thel, supra
note 9, at 113. I question their insistence that courts always require express, clear
promises as a prerequisite to enforcement. In my view, courts do enforce less than clear
promises if the surrounding circumstances, including the norms of the relationship in
which the promise was made, would reasonably lead a promisee to infer a promise. That
is, what is important to courts is not necessarily the force or clarity with which a
representation is made, but whether, given the relationship between the parties, the
promisee was reasonable both in interpreting the promisor's actions and representations
as a promise and in relying on that promise, and whether the promisor generated a
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enforcement is justifiable because even apparently "gratuitous"
promises generate reciprocal benefit for the promisor, even if that
benefit does not fit within traditional definitions of
"consideration."' As Kull states, "[a] person makes a promise,
gratuitous or compensated, because he derives a benefit (altruistic or
otherwise) from the promisee's greater certainty of expectation. ' '235
Further, the ability to make an enforceable gratuitous promise
enables the promisor to obtain the benefit of that promise at a lower
cost than he would otherwise have to bear. 6 Kull argues that an
understanding of gratuitous promises as conferring a reciprocal
benefit on the promisor underlies decisions enforcing gratuitous
promises, even though courts sculpt their rationales into accepted
doctrinal shapes such as promissory estoppel or consideration? 7
Professors Farber and Matheson document enforcement of
gratuitous promises that have induced no provable detrimental
benefit by making those representations. Cf. Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of
Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel. An
Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895, 905-06 (1987) (arguing that a promisor
will be liable if certain factors, e.g., the parties' involvement in a trust-based relationship,
prevented the parties from formalizing a contract and "a plausible benefit to the promisor
can be identified").
234. See Kull, supra note 5, at 59-62. But see Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in
LAW, MORALrrY, AND SOciETY 210, 213-14 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977)
(arguing that it is wrong as a matter of analysis to say a necessary condition to a promise
is that a promisor must receive, or expect to receive, a benefit).
235. Kull, supra note 5, at 57; see also Posner, supra note 40, at 412-13 (arguing that, in
certain situations, the ability to make a legally enforceable promise generates utility for
the promisor by "increasing the present value of an uncertain future stream of transfer
payments").
236. See Kull, supra note 5, at 61. Kull states that "a person will normally give no
assurances beyond those necessary to induce the desired level of reliance or expectation
in his listeners. The context of gift normally requires a lower level of warranty than the
context of bargain." Id. Kull also suggests that the ability to promise may have been the
promisor's only tool for achieving his ends in a particular instance. See id. at 62. Richard
Craswell also acknowledges that the promisor obtains a benefit from the act of promising
and argues that one important benefit is that it induces an efficient level of reliance. See
Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 483,
487-94 (1996).
237. See Kull, supra note 5, at 40-46. Kull excludes from his rule promises that are not
intended to be legally enforceable and mentions "intra-familial" promises as an example
of such promises. See id. at 40 n.3. He notes that courts traditionally have been less
inclined to enforce express, written gratuitous promises within the family context and
acknowledges that those cases present a problem for his thesis. See id. at 45 n.23. I
contend that courts are reluctant to discuss familial obligations in contract terms because
commodification of those relationships would devalue them. I do, however, argue that
courts deciding wills cases routinely enforce implied promises in the family context,
because the construct of wills law permits enforcement without the necessity of resorting
to contract concepts. See infra Part V.
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reliance. 28 They suggest that the key to modem promissory estoppel
doctrine lies in an examination of the context in which the words and
actions allegedly giving rise to liability occurred.239 They claim that
courts enforce seemingly gratuitous promises-promises made
without consideration and that do not inspire detrimental reliance-if
the promises are made in the context of a continuing relationship that
requires a high level of mutual confidence and trust.24 A rule of
enforcement in those circumstances lowers transaction costs and
encourages relationships that are economically beneficial to both the
parties and to society as a whole.241
Like Kull, Farber and Matheson believe that courts understand
that promisors sometimes benefit from the mere making of the
promise.42 Farber and Matheson assert that the key to determining
whether a court will impose liability is whether the promisor incurred
an "economic benefit" from the very act of making the promise.243
For instance, they rely on Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,24 in which
238. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 910-14, 920-24.
239. See id. at 928-29. The authors demonstrate that "the cases in which courts have
pushed the doctrine of promissory estoppel beyond its stated justification ... involve
relationships in which one party must depend on the word of the other to engage in
socially beneficial reliance." Id. at 928; see also Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips,
The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35
RUTGERs L. REv. 472, 506-07 (1983) (arguing that one explanation for the expansion of
promissory estoppel is that the doctrine is "an outgrowth of a more interdependent,
community oriented moral climate"); Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95
HARv. L. REv. 916, 929 (1982) (book review) ("The relationship, with its normative
implications, provides the code by which actions and omissions are interpreted and their
normative significance established. An act has different normative implications
depending on its social context.").
240. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 925.
241. See id. at 925-30. Taking this trend to its logical extreme, Jay Feinman has urged
a new approach to promissory estoppel, one that would focus its analysis on the
obligations and entitlements created by the particular relationship at issue. He argues
that analyzing promissory estoppel cases with an understanding of the dynamics of
interdependent relationships would eliminate the problematic aspects of the doctrine
while maintaining its objective of supporting and regulating productive exchange
behavior in society. See Feinman, supra note 20, at 312-15. Feinman stops short of
analyzing whether "donative promises" made in the family context would be enforceable
under his model. See id. at 313.
242. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 920-25.
243. See id. at 922. According to Farber and Matheson:
It is not surprising to find courts imposing liability when the defendant has made
a promise in the expectation of receiving an economic benefit from the
plaintiff.... [B]reach of a promise seems especially unjust when the promisor
was willing to reap economic benefits from the promise but not to pay the price.
Id.
244. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). The court in Pine River awarded damages for
breach of contract to an employee who was discharged in violation of the procedural
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the court enforced a promise by an employer to an employee even
though the only "consideration" given by the employee was his
continued appearance at work after the employer made the
promise.245 Farber and Matheson argue that, in cases like Pine River,
courts draw "'inferences of reciprocity' "246-- clearly, the employer
intended to benefit in some way from the promise, whether through
increased production or improved morale, or by the reactions of
parties other than the promisee.247 Even though the employer's
promise was not part of a discrete exchange in which the employee
provided reciprocal consideration, Farber and Matheson argue that
the promise did create reciprocal benefits within the interdependent
relationship that was the backdrop for the promise.248 They argue
that courts require only these reciprocal benefits-not traditional
consideration or reliance by the promisee-for enforcement of
promises.249
Recently decided cases confirm both the views of Kull and of
Farber and Matheson. For example, in Schonholz v. Long Island
Jewish Medical Center- ° the Second Circuit reversed the trial court's
grant of the defendant medical center's motion for summary
judgment in an action by an officer of the hospital who claimed that
she had relied to her detriment on the hospital's "promise" to pay
certain severance benefits. 1' The hospital had requested the officer's
resignation because she was constantly at odds with the hospital's
chairman. The officer orally agreed to resign.z 2 In a subsequent
letter, the hospital's president confirmed the officer's impending
resignation and noted that "[o]f course, the terms of your severance
will be governed by the [Long Island Jewish] Medical Center
personnel policies ... including the Severance Pay Program ....
safeguards outlined in the employee handbook because the employee's "continued
performance despite his freedom to leave" equaled both acceptance of the employer's
"offer" and consideration. Id. at 626-27.
245. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 920 (citing Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at
629).
246. Id. at 921 (quoting Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1308).
247. See id. at 924-29.
248. See id. at 925-26 ("In the context of ongoing relationships, exchange is a
continuing rather than a discrete event. Where such relationships are highly
interdependent, economic benefit is likely to be sought through informal understandings
that reinforce the relationship, rather than through discrete bargains." (footnote
omitted)).
249. See id. at 925-28.
250. 87 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996).
251. See id. at 79-80.
252. See id. at 74.
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Please arrange to meet with the Vice-Presidents of Finance and
Human Resources to discuss ... the details."' 53  The officer
subsequently formalized her resignation in writing. Shortly
thereafter, the Board voted to rescind the Severance Plan. The trial
court dismissed the officer's promissory estoppel action as "without
merit as a matter of law.''154
Reversing, the Second Circuit held that a single fact was
sufficient to defeat the hospital's summary judgment motion: The
officer had written the formal resignation letter after the alleged
promise to pay severance benefits was made.55  Although the
hospital was "free to terminate the Severance Plan at any time absent
any promise to vest [the officer], that fact alone is not enough to
defeat [the officer's] claim." 6 Even though the hospital had in fact
not promised to vest the officer's benefits, the court held that the
officer detrimentally relied on the "promise," even though that
"promise" was made after the employee had orally agreed to resign
and before the president had made any reference at all to the
possible payment of severance benefits. 7
From the court's recitation of facts, it is clear that the hospital
gave the employee the option to resign as an alternative to being
fired 5 8 The trial court must have reasoned that she would have
resigned, no matter what the severance terms, rather than be fired; it
rejected plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim because the plaintiff
"could not demonstrate any injury." 9 In reversing on that question,
the Second Circuit did not emphasize the reliance of the officer.
After all, because the officer had already agreed to resign, she could
not very well argue that she resigned in reliance on the availability of
the subsequently offered severance package. Instead, the Second
Circuit emphasized the perceived benefit that the hospital received
from the officer's formal letter of resignation.2 60  The officer's
resignation benefited the hospital because it saved the hospital the
trouble of firing the employee, the court reasoned, and the officer
gave up the "power to withhold that benefit" when she voluntarily
253. Id.
254. Id. at 75.
255. See id. at 79 (stating that "[the officer's] submission of her resignation just four
days after the December 18 letter is, by itself, enough to create a triable issue as to
reliance").
256. Id.
257. See id. at 74.
258. See id. at 74-75.
259. Id. at 77.
260. See id. at 79-80.
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resigned.26' The court concluded that it was that "possibility of loss"
that the jury should be permitted to consider. 6' Thus, the court
recognized an enforceable promise even absent provable reliance
when a promise both reinforced an interdependent relationship (as
did the promise implicit in the severance plan that was thereafter
terminated) and conferred additional benefits on the promisor (as
did the employer's "promise" to comply with the severance plan).
Other recent cases are in accord with this reasoning.263
Thus, courts often impose obligations based on promises made
in the context of interdependent relationships, even absent proof of
actual, detrimental reliance. But even more startling is that some
courts have awarded recovery in the name of promissory estoppel
even absent proof of an express promise.2 4  Courts analyzing a
promise made in the context of an interdependent relationship do
not, as one might expect, concentrate solely on whether the promisor
made a definite promise. Rather, they also examine the context in
which words and actions occurred to determine whether the alleged
promisee reasonably interpreted words and actions as a promise.
According to Farber and Matheson, "[tihe less formal the parties'
actions, the greater must be the court's attention to their context. '"2 65
The parties' words and actions must then be considered from an
objective standard: What expectations would have been "likely to
arise between similarly situated parties"? 266  Thus, a doctor's
261. Id. (surmising that "firing [the officer] might have affected employee morale at
LIJ and could have led to a very abrupt and turbulent transition from [the officer] to a
new Chief Operating Officer").
262. Id. at 80.
263. For example, in Axelson v. Minneapolis Teachers' Retirement Fund Ass'n, 532
N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), the court ruled in favor of a teacher who sued his
retirement fund association for rejecting his application to purchase retirement service
credits for a two-year period when he worked for the Peace Corps. See id. at 595. The
teacher first requested the credits some years after serving and was told that he could
purchase those credits by a certain date. See id. A reasonable inference that could be
drawn from the letter was that he could purchase the credits after the date, for an
increased sum. The teacher declined to purchase the credits because he lacked the funds.
See id. at 596. Some 15 years later he decided to purchase the credits, at which time his
application was denied. See id. The court of appeals reversed an agency determination
dismissing his claim, determining that the teacher's decision to defer purchase for 15 years
was in reliance on the agency's promise to allow him to purchase after the deadline, even
though the court itself admitted that his decision to forego purchase initially was based on
the fact that he had insufficient funds. See id. at 597-98.
264. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 916-17; infra notes 269-86 and
accompanying text.
265. Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 915.
266. Id. at 915 n.45. Remarking on the conclusory tone often adopted by courts,
Farber and Matheson state:
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reassurance to a patient after a tubal ligation that it was impossible
for her to become pregnant was not a promise, but mere
reassurance.267 According to the authors, "[g]iven the common
understanding that physicians generally do not give warranties, the
court's conclusion was correct. ' 261
Yet, in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship of long
standing, a different court determined that a promise should be
implied by conduct alone.2 69 In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Rubish,270 a landlord twice agreed to extend a lease on oral notice,
despite a lease provision requiring the tenant to request renewals in
writing.271 The court held that the tenant, in giving oral notice a third
time, had relied on an implicit promise that no written notice would
thereafter be required.272 Presumably, the court determined that,
given the context of an ongoing, mutually beneficial relationship, the
tenant could reasonably infer that he could trust the landlord to
behave in accordance with prior conduct. Similarly, the court in
Axelson v. Minneapolis Teachers' Retirement Fund Ass'n273 construed
a letter allowing a teacher to purchase retirement "credits" by
December 31, 1975, or some "later date" as constituting a promise to
allow him to purchase those credits some fifteen years later.274
These opinions support Ian Macneil's view that "promise" is but
one component in contractual analysis, which may be given less
weight than other factors when circumstances suggest that the
parties' relationship gave rise to reasonable economic expectations.275
The closer the relationship between promisor and promisee, the less
Judges called upon to determine whether a promise has been made must look
beyond the words and acts which constitute the transaction to the nature of the
relationship between the parties and the circumstances surrounding their
actions.... The conclusory tone follows because we are being told what we
ought already to understand as members of the community. It is inherent in the
use of an objective standard-under both traditional contract and promissory
estoppel theories of obligation-to determine whether a commitment was
voluntarily made.
Id
267. See id. at 915-17 & nn.47-50 (discussing Garcia v. Von Micsky, 602 F.2d 51, 52-53
(2d Cir. 1979)).
268. Id. at 916.
269. See id. at 917 & nn.56-57 (discussing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306
N.C. 417,293 S.E.2d 749 (1982)).
270. 306 N.C. 417,293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
271. See id. at 429, 293 S.E.2d at 757.
272 See id.
273. 532 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
274. See id. at 596-98; supra note 263 (discussing Axelson in greater detail).
275. See Macneil, supra note 8, at 734-35.
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capable are the parties of reducing their understandings to express
agreement 276-thus, context is paramount.277
A particularly instructive example is D & G Stout, Inc. v.
Bacardi Imports, Inc.27 A local distributor inquired of Bacardi
whether Bacardi would continue to use the distributor in the
future.279  Unbeknownst to Bacardi, the distributor sought the
assurance because it was deciding whether to close its operations, sell
the business, or continue with business as usual s0 Bacardi responded
to the inquiry by stating that if the distributor continued to meet
Bacardi's sales expectations, and if there were no changes in market
conditions, Bacardi would continue to use the distributor.281
Ultimately, Bacardi decided to switch distributors based on
information that the plaintiff distributor's prospects for viability were
decreasing, information that the distributor later claimed was
inaccurate.' Despite the clearly conditional nature of Bacardi's oral
assurances, and Bacardi's ignorance of the distributor's reliance on
those assurances, the court held that the assurances amounted to an
enforceable promise.283 In so holding, the court stressed the context
in which the assurances were given:
[T]he liquor distribution business traditionally had operated
on an informal basis. Long term relationships were formed
based on nothing more than a handshake. Bacardi and
General had done business in this environment for years to
the satisfaction of both, making it all the more reasonable
for Bacardi to have expected General to rely on Bacardi's
word, and for General to actually rely on it .... Nothing in
the changes sweeping the liquor market ... suggested that
the old rules were out the window, particularly with respect
to a relationship of such long standing.m
276. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1090-91 (noting that "reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations" may be impracticable because of
the parties' "inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to
characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can
be identified in advance").
277. See Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
340 (1983) (arguing that comprehending the contract involves understanding the context).
278. 805 F. Supp. 1434 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
279. See id. at 1439.
280. See id. at 1437-39.
281. See id. at 1439.
282. See id. at 1441-42.
283. See id. at 1444-45 (holding that "[t]he conditional or indefinite nature of the
promise standing alone does not preclude an action under a promissory estoppel theory").
284. Id. at 1451.
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In short, the distributor was justified in relying on Bacardi's
assurances because it had developed a relationship of trust with
Bacardi. Because of that background-a relationship within a
business culture that emphasized trust-Bacardi should have
assumed that its conditional promise would have been understood as
a promise to deal fairly with the distributor.?' The court's decision
supports and validates reliance induced by trust, implicitly
recognizing that trust is necessary to maximize the benefits of
interdependent relationships that are beneficial to society as a whole.
As Farber and Matheson note, when relationships are "highly
interdependent, economic benefit is likely to be sought through
informal understandings that reinforce the relationship, rather than
through discrete bargains. ' 26
Of course, other courts do not routinely enforce seemingly
gratuitous promises.' But the existence of recent cases declining to
enforce gratuitous promises does not necessarily undermine the
strength of Farber and Matheson's observations. A finding of non-
enforceability does not necessarily mean that a court reflexively
applied classical doctrine; rather, it is probable that the court found
that the relationship within which the promise was made was not
sufficiently interdependent to give rise to reasonable inferences of
reciprocity. 8 Promises made within the context of a relationship
285. In considering relevant business norms, the court understood that the relational
contract was formed within "a minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond the norms
centered on exchange and its immediate processes." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 901 (1978).
286. Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 925-26.
287. See, e.g., Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961)
(rejecting the plaintiff's claim because the plaintiff did not rely on the doctor's promise);
Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091, 1096 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the
plaintiff's decision to retire was made prior to any promise by the employer, and so the
plaintiff could not establish that he retired in reliance on those, promises).
288. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 923-24. Melvin Eisenberg vigorously
opposes the notion that courts enforce gratuitous promises made in a business setting.
See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 863. His basic arguments are: (1) reliance is a
prerequisite to enforceability because the Restatements say that it is, see id. at 859; and
(2) he can point to specific cases wherein courts declined to enforce promises on the
grounds that they were gratuitous, see id. at 863. His arguments are problematic in two
respects. First, his emphasis on the Restatements misses the mark-the project of "third-
wave" scholars (as he terms them) is to determine what courts are actually doing,
whatever they may be saying. Second, he fails to consider relational contract theory, and
more specifically Farber and Matheson's article, which changes the nature of the debate.
Thus, the question is not simply, "Are gratuitous promises enforceable?" but "When are
gratuitous promises enforceable?" Phrased this way, it becomes clear that certain
gratuitous promises are unenforceable not just because doctrine says they are not, but
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that requires "a high level of mutual confidence and trust" are more
likely to generate some benefit for the promisor or encourage
reliance by the proisee.289
In sum, courts often view seemingly gratuitous promises as
having reciprocal characteristics that justify enforcement. First, the
promisor may benefit from the act of making the promise. Second,
courts intuit that those involved in an ongoing or interdependent
relationship might, through words and/or actions, create certain
expectations in one another and might benefit from creating and
encouraging those expectations.2 10  In contracts law, at least, the
rhetoric that insists on a sharp divide between gift and exchange
paints a misleading picture of the case law.
Why, then, do contracts scholars continue to insist that non-
commercial gratuitous promises and testamentary transfers are
unilateral and unenforceable,2 91 notwithstanding some troubling
exceptions for which they cannot account? 292  Why assume that
because the contexts in which those promises were made were not sufficiently trust-based
to justify enforceability.
289. Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 925.
290. As Joseph Raz notes, "[tihe relationship, with its normative implications,
provides the code by which actions and omissions are interpreted and their normative
significance established. An act has different normative implications depending on its
social context." Raz, supra note 239, at 929.
291. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 937-38 (noting that donative
promises made within the family context are clearly not enforceable because "these
promises are not generally made to coordinate activities or generate reliance beneficial to
the promisor," but also acknowledging that family law "may well need to be reformed in
order to protect values similar to those that we have identified in the field of contract
law"); Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1308 (stating that "intrafamilial donations ... are
peculiarly resistant to interactive adjustment and epitomize the non-reciprocity of
donative promises"); see also Kull, supra note 5, at 40 & n.3 (arguing that seriously
intended gratuitous promises are enforced, unless they are "understood by both parties to
create no legally enforceable obligation," a category which includes "promises respecting
social engagements and many intrafamilial promises").
292. One type of gratuitous promise that gives scholars trouble is the charitable
subscription, which is, according to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
enforceable, even if no consideration or reliance exists. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981). Goetz and Scott account for this by noting that charitable
gratuitous promises are more likely to be the subject of negotiation and bargaining than
other types of gratuitous promises, so the choice of enforceability rule would have less
impact here than it would on gratuitous transfers made in situations in which social
impediments to bargaining exist. They also emphasize the benefits (recognition and
increased self-esteem) the promisor receives in making the pledge. See Goetz & Scott,
supra note 36, at 1307-08. These grounds for distinction are unpersuasive. First, as we
have seen, gratuitous promisors generally receive benefits from the very act of promising.
Moreover, as I argue in more detail, the choice of enforcement rule would have little
impact on gratuitous promises made within intimate relationships. See infra Parts V.A. &
V.B.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 861 (distinguishing enforcement of charitable
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courts' implicit understanding of the reciprocal nature of
interdependent relationships disappears with a wave of the wand the
moment the promisor dies? Why not assume instead that this
understanding forms a background against which courts decide wills
cases? The relationships involved in will contests are even more
likely to be highly interdependent and based upon trust, and the
promises made in the context of those relationships are much less
likely to be reduced to an express agreement. 2 93
V. Is ENFORCEMENT OF IMPLIED FAMILY UNDERSTANDINGS
JUSTIFIABLE?
Once we accept that courts do enforce implicit understandings
between interdependent parties, the obvious question is why do they
do it? It has been suggested that courts enforce such understandings
in the commercial context in order to promote efficiency.
Specifically, courts mean to encourage reliance on relationships that
maximize efficiency, for the ultimate good of the parties to the
relationship and to society as a whole.2 94 Because risk aversion in
those settings would discourage productive relationships, the law
should support and encourage actions based on trust.95
This argument is problematic. It assumes that parties are aware
of, and consult, applicable law in their jurisdiction prior to taking any
action in furtherance of a long-term business relationship. It also
assumes that judges believe that those parties know the law and are
actively seeking to influence behavior. But the justification is even
more troubling when one attempts to apply it to the enforcement of
promises made in intimate settings. Does enforcement of implicit
family understandings advance instrumental objectives? Specifically,
does enforcement encourage reliance and reciprocity within family
relationships? Generally speaking, the answer is no. Even if courts
consciously attempted to encourage reliance by family members,
their efforts would have little effect because family members are even
less likely than commercial actors to consult statutes and judicial
decisions in shaping their relationships with parents, children, and
spouses. Accordingly, many of the insights contained in recent
scholarship on gratuitous promises are inapplicable to promises made
pledges because relationships between donors and charities are not "affective," so that
enforcement does not cheapen the relationship, and because "important social policy"
reasons exist for enforcing pledges to charities).
293. See supra Parts II.A.4 & II.B.
294. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 945.
295. See id.
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in the family realm because these insights rely on the assumption that
the particular legal rule will influence whether and to what extent
family members will make implicit arrangements and whether to
honor the implied terms of those agreements. 96
Indeed, to the extent that legal rules might affect behavior at the
margins, a rule directing enforcement of testators' implied promises
to family members might have undesirable effects; a rule that reveals
and emphasizes the reciprocal nature of family obligations might
devalue family relationships. By contrast, the current legal regime,
which emphasizes testamentary intent and autonomy while enforcing
implicit family understandings, allows courts to honor important
social norms and to simultaneously minimize efficiency losses that
would be created by explicitly treating family relationships as
analogous to market transactions.
A. An Enforceability Rule Would Not Encourage Trust or Increase
Efficient Outcomes
In their study of express and implicit promises in the commercial
context, Farber and Matheson suggest that enforcement of certain
promises encourages trust and efficient reliance, which benefits both
the parties to the relationship and the economy as a whole.29 Noting
the importance of trust in long-term, interdependent business
relationships and existing impediments to trust such as risk-averse
personalities and asymmetrical information, they argue that
gratuitous promises should be enforced even absent clear reliance:
"The point in these cases is not that reliance has taken place in a
particular instance, but rather that reliance should be encouraged
among participants in a class of activities. '"2 9
Can judicial enforcement of testators' implied promises to family
members be justified on the grounds that enforcement encourages
trust and efficient reliance? First, even if a clear rule enforcing
implicit promises among family members would encourage efficient
reliance, existing wills doctrine does not embody such a rule: Wills
decisions emphasize autonomy and intent, not reciprocity and
obligation. Second, and more importantly, even a clear legal rule
enforcing implied promises would not affect interactions between
family members because family members assess the relationship, not
296. But see Macaulay, supra note 3, at 468-69 (arguing that business actors pay little
attention to legal rules in interacting and incurring obligations).
297. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 3, at 905.
298. Id. at 929.
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the legal rule, in determining the extent to which they should invest
in that relationship.
Courts do not communicate the enforcement rule to the public.
When courts take into account family claims, they claim to be
honoring testamentary intent-thus, they re-emphasize the
importance of autonomy, not interdependence. Even if some courts
do consciously honor the reciprocity norm in deciding wills cases,
that fact, obscured as it is by doctrine that nominally emphasizes
intent, is not likely to be transmitted to the average layperson. To
determine that courts often reward family members' reciprocally
based claims, family members would have to read between the lines
of judicial opinions, something most laypeople are not apt to do.
And if family members cannot understand the subtleties of case law,
there is little chance that particular decisions will affect social
behavior.
Even an express rule enforcing testators' implied promises
would do little to increase reliance and reciprocity. Suppose for a
moment that courts clearly announced a rule enforcing implicit
promises in favor of family members. Even such an express rule
would have a negligible impact on behavior because most people do
not consider applicable legal rules prior to interacting with family
members. In concrete terms, Mary, in deciding to drop out of law
school to attend to her ill mother, is not likely to calculate: "Well,
she'll probably leave me her estate if I do, and if she doesn't, I can
always sue." A husband who decides to work hard at a job he hates
to put his wife through medical school probably would not calculate:
"Well, if she leaves me as soon as she completes her residency I can
always sue her for half the market value of her degree." An uncle
who contributes to his adult nephew's medical school tuition
probably does not expect to sue his nephew for restitution if the
nephew neglects his uncle later in life. Indeed, the availability of
legal redress does not appear likely, in these instances, to influence
behavior even at the margins. Most decisions regarding whether and
to what extent to trust other family members are based on an
evaluation of the trustworthiness of the other, not the availability of
legal relief if trust proves misplaced.
Standardized family roles also inform individual assessments of
the other's trustworthiness,29 9 in much the same way that
standardized roles provide a helpful guide in making initial
assessments of trust prior to initiating relationships in a commercial
299. See supra Part II.A.3.
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context. If anything, we are taught that business transactions are
motivated by self-interest and conducted at arm's length. Thus,
business actors are more apt to consider applicable legal rules prior
to acting and to take increased risks only if they perceive that the law
will back them up.3G° But in the family context, standardized roles
confirm our sense that we can trust our family, that family members
will not act purely from self-interest. Thus, we need not bring the
suspicion inherent in a business transaction to a family relationship.
Standardized roles encourage trust in the relationship rather than the
law. Thus, an express rule enforcing implied family understandings
would do little to encourage trust or increase efficient outcomes.
B. Enforcing Testators' Implied Promises Would Not Generate
Inefficiencies
For the same reason-family members do not understand legal
doctrine, and even if they did, doctrine would not influence their
actions-an express rule enforcing implied promises among family
members would not necessarily encourage inefficient behavior. The
following Part examines several other arguments for non-
enforcement of "gratuitous" promises, all of which are premised on
efficiency concerns; the Part concludes that, in the family context,
none of them justify a regime of non-enforcement.
Professors Goetz and Scott argue that enforcement of gratuitous
promises made in situations that preclude free information-gathering
would have little effect on a particular promisor's decision to breach
because "extra-legal" sanctions sufficiently police the promisor's
behavior."' Moreover, they argue, enforcement could create
substantial costs: Such a rule would require promisors to heavily
condition promises they do make (to insulate themselves from future
300. The explanation of Farber and Matheson seems to assume that particular court
decisions are transmitted to the public and understood by it, even though courts do not
announce that they are departing from the settled doctrines of consideration or
promissory estoppel, but purport to apply them. Although some business actors might be
apprised of the law by legal counsel, others (employees for instance) may not be. To the
extent that their argument assumes that private actors understand the nuances of case
law, it is not entirely persuasive. In addition, to the extent that they argue that courts
enforce unrelied-upon promises in order to encourage individuals in commercial
relationships to trust one another, their argument is undermined by evidence that
business people do not actually consult the law prior to making agreements or engaging in
relationships. See Macaulay, supra note 3, at 467-68 (indicating that the law is largely
irrelevant to those engaged in commercial relationships). Of course, even if Macaulay is
correct, courts may nevertheless believe that their rulings affect behavior.
301. Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1304-05; see also Posner, supra note 40, at 417
(recognizing the importance of social sanctions on family behavior).
[Vol. 77
ENFORCING FAMILY PROMISES
liability if they later choose not to perform) and would ultimately
discourage promise-making when the social context prohibits heavily
conditional promises. While conceding that a non-enforcement rule
might result in an inefficient level of reliance, they assert that these
inefficiencies would be smaller than those created by an enforcement
rule.3 0 Eric Posner adds that an enforcement rule might encourage
promisees to "over rely" because promisees would know they would
be compensated for their reliance.33
Both arguments overestimate the effect that a legal rule would
have on family behavior. In intimate family relationships, parties are
likely to disregard the legal rule and focus almost entirely on their
estimation of the trustworthiness of the other family member, their
desire to maximize the value of the long-term relationship, and their
altruistic impulses to benefit the other party to the relationship.
Although Goetz and Scott (correctly) acknowledge that family
members are more likely to be influenced by social sanctions than
legal ones,3"4 they fail to carry this insight to its logical conclusion. If
parties are far more influenced by social norms and sanctions in
determining whether to honor an agreement, legal rules would have
little effect on the promisor's decision whether to make a promise in
the first place. Thus, a potential promisor involved in a long-term
relationship would not make a promise that might affect the
promisee's behavior if the promisor thinks there is even a small
chance she will change her mind. To keep the promisee's trust, which
is vital to the health of the relationship, the promisor will feel
compelled to make only those promises she is reasonably certain she
can keep, regardless of whether her promises are legally enforceable.
If she makes the promises at all, she will heavily condition them, not
out of fears of legal enforcement, but to avoid disappointing the
promisee in the future. The promisor knows that breaking a promise
302- See Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1304-05; see also Posner, supra note 3, at 593-
94 (making essentially the same point). Goetz and Scott contrast this result to the effects
of a non-enforcement rule: If a promisee knows that the promise is not legally
enforceable, the promisee will protect herself against the possibility of non-performance
by tempering her reliance. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1278-80. According to
Goetz and Scott, a non-enforcement rule is more desirable because the promisee's
"adjustments will be more precise and less costly in reduced reliance than the solely
quantitative precautionary adjustments available to promisors reluctant to impair the
social relationship." Id. at 1305.
303. See Posner, supra note 3, at 594. Richard Craswell also notes this argument, but
rejects it, concluding that enforcement would still create cases in which overreliance is
less costly than underreliance and that sometimes the rule would inspire efficient reliance,
which is the optimal outcome. See Craswell, supra note 236, at 494.
304. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 36, at 1272.
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would upset the promisee and decrease or destroy the trust between
the parties, which would substantially devalue the relationship-a
concern of far greater importance to the promisor than the specter of
legal liability.
Similarly, the degree to which a promisee will rely on an implied
promise depends entirely upon the promisee's estimation of the
promisor's trustworthiness. If trustworthiness is doubtful, the fact
that a court might in fact enforce the obligation will be unlikely to
encourage reliance-the last thing that most people intend to do is
sue close family members over disappointments. Thus, family
members would act the same way regardless of the legal rule; they
would not make fewer or more heavily conditioned promises if the
rule were changed because the law would add little to the sanction
the relationship already provides. Enforcement of these implied
promises, then, would not realistically induce excess caution in
promisors or excess reliance in promisees.
Melvin Eisenberg has advanced a second argument against
enforcement of gratuitous transfers. He begins by refuting the
traditional argument for non-enforcement 3 5 that gratuitous promises
in non-commercial settings generate little value, and that
enforcement costs easily outweigh the value that would be created by
enforcement. 6 He focuses on the role of the donative promise
within the larger context of a particular relationship3 7 and argues
305. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 84649 (arguing that gratuitous promises made in
non-commercial settings are in fact often more valuable than those made in commercial
contexts).
306. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-7
(1979) (emphasizing the lack of injury to a disappointed promisee and high enforcement
costs); see also Posner, supra note 40, at 417 (justifying the non-enforcement rule of
"trivial social promises, especially within the family" because such promises involve
"small stakes," extra-legal sanctions adequately police behavior, and enforcement costs
would greatly outweigh the benefits of enforcement). It is telling that traditionally,
analysts of the gratuitous promise issue consistently illustrate the problem with examples
involving an uncle who promises his nephew he will do some specific act but later reneges.
As this Article argues, the uncle-nephew scenario is not representative of the majority of
family agreements, which are much more complex and are generally less clearly
expressed. In conceptualizing the donative transfer so cleanly, scholars of the old school
were blinded to the more common, and much more difficult, types of promises that
regularly occur within families and thus greatly underestimated the value generated by
family promises. See, e.g., Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting; 4 A.L.I. PROC. 95-103
(1926) (providing the discussions of Williston and others on appropriate damage
calculation when a donative promise inspires reliance); Eisenberg, supra, at 5-6; see also
Posner, supra note 40, at 412-14, 416 (taking the abstraction even farther by simply
hypothesizing individuals "A" and "B," who appear to have no intimate connection or
family relationship with one another).
307. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 840-46.
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that such donative promises are even more valuable than promises
that result from clear bargains. 0 From this he concludes that courts
should not enforce donative promises within personal relationships
because enforcement would devalue the act of giving and, by
extension, the relationship itself.0 9 Taking a cue from Margaret
Radin,31 0 Eisenberg argues that enforcement of gratuitous transfers
would introduce the language of commodification into the realm of
personal relationships, thereby creating confusion.311 For example, a
promisee would not know whether a promisor performed his promise
out of love or because he feared a lawsuit; the promisee would
therefore ascribe less value to the gift.312
Although Eisenberg's observation about the value of donative
promises within personal relationships is sound, his analysis of
whether courts should enforce them misses the mark because he, too,
overstates the impact of law on interpersonal relationships. Most
people in intimate relationships characterized by a high degree of
trust will assume that people whom they love keep their promises out
of love, not out of fear of enforcement. For instance, does Maggie, a
fifteen-year-old child, value the financial support she obtains from
her parents less because the law would require her parents to provide
for her if they refused to do so? Does Arthur, a sixty-year-old
widower, value his wife's testamentary gift of the bulk of her estate
any less because the law would-give him an elective share if she failed
to provide for him? In both cases, the donee assumes that the donor
308. See id. at 849.
309. See id. at 847-49. Eric Posner also makes this claim in the Introduction to
Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises. See Posner, supra
note 3, at 567.
310. See Radin, supra note 79.
311. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 847-49. Eisenberg admits, however, that
gratuitous promises that inspire reasonable reliance should be enforceable to the extent
of the reliance. See id. at 834, 865. It is hard to reconcile his assumption with his main
point. If the value of the performance to the promisee would be cheapened by the
knowledge that the law provides a remedy, the same would hold when the promisee
relied; thus, how can he determine the promisee's motive?
312. Eisenberg also notes that sometimes promisors might have a morally justifiable
reason for promise-breaking-e.g., others have made more urgent demands on his limited
resources. See id. at 849-50. In these cases, Eisenberg argues, promisees should not be
entitled to enforcement because the promisee is morally obligated to release the promisor
from his obligation. See id. Of course, people release each other from moral obligations
all the time. When the promisee feels release is justified, he will not sue for enforcement.
The difficulty arises when the promisee feels the breach is not justifiable. Why should we
assume that reneging was justifiable rather than litigate the issue? Eisenberg also
assumes that a promisor who has inspired the promisee to rely on the promise is morally
obligated to perform. See id. at 823, 834. Why, then, is a promisor who received a benefit
from the act of promising not similarly obligated?
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is motivated by altruism. Similarly, promisees would assume
altruistic or loving motives for performance of gratuitous promises
even if the law enforced those promises. The promisee's assessment
of the promisor's character, not the law, determines what motivations
the promisee will ascribe to the promisor. 13
Eric Posner gives a different twist on the argument against
enforcement of gratuitous promises made within the context of
interpersonal relationships.314 Although Posner acknowledges that
gratuitous transfers and promises within trust-based relationships
may be valuable, he contends that long-term relationships are a mix
of promises, some of which are intended to be enforceable, and
others that are not.315 When parties fail to specify in advance which
promises are intended to be enforceable, the costs of enforcement are
large because courts will not immediately know which promises to
enforce.316 To cut those costs and to encourage parties to specify in
advance which promises they intend to be enforceable, courts do not
generally enforce vague, gratuitous promises made within an
interdependent relationship.3 17
313. One could take the non-commodification argument farther and argue that the
very act of adjudication and enforcement of gratuitous promises would cheapen intimate
relationships because it would require speaking about them in contract terms. If
permitted to operate, this process would, as Radin puts it, "endorse[] the picture of
persons as profit-maximizers." Radin, supra note 79, at 1907. Thus, the party seeking
enforcement of a gratuitous promise would have to reveal self-interested motives and
speak the language of contract: "I earned it," "I relied on it," etc. Although it certainly
would be distasteful to speak of close relationships in those terms, it is not accurate to say
that the process would devalue the particular relationship in which the promise was made.
Rather, it was the promisor's act of breaking the promise that devalued the relationship. At
that point, the promisor seriously diminished or destroyed the promisee's trust in the
promisor. The promisor has revealed that his motives were not necessarily as altruistic as
the promisee might have supposed. The promisee no longer believes he can trust the
word of the promisor. Thus, although the act of litigating enforcement might further
decrease value, the decrease would seem to be insubstantial compared to the decrease
brought about by the promisor's breach of promise. At least the provision of the remedy
would provide the promisee with something of value, whereas a rule of non-enforceability
would leave him with nothing.
314. See Posner, supra note 3.
315. See id. at 578-81.
316. See id.
317. Posner acknowledges that courts increasingly have been willing to enforce
commercial promises that are vague as to whether the parties contemplated legal
enforcement-e.g., firm offers and requirement contracts-because "commercial
exigency" demanded it. Id. at 606. He appears to assume (although he does not say so
expressly) that enforcement of these vague but efficient contracts will encourage parties
to make more of them. He states that whether this loosening of the consideration
requirement should be extended to non-commercial promises depends entirely on the
value that is generated by such promises. See id. But again, this analysis fails when
applied to the family context, where individuals are unlikely to be influenced by the legal
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Although Posner does not delineate between commercial and
intimate relationships, his model of relationships appears to
contemplate primarily commercial relationships or personal
relationships that contain an unusually high number of express, quid
pro quo exchanges. He seems to claim that his analysis is applicable
to all situations involving gratuitous transfers, but his examples all
involve promises made within the legal academy-a context in which
parties are much more likely to consider the availability of legal
remedies prior to acting.318
Posner's explanation is unpersuasive when applied to family
interactions. First, as we have seen, courts in wills cases certainly do
not transmit the enforceability of grantors' promises to the general
public. But even supposing such a rule were express, it is hard to
believe that courts would seek to induce family members to discuss in
advance which of their promises are intended to be enforced. Family
relationships do not fit Posner's model of a series of intended
enforceable and non-enforceable agreements; rather, parties in this
context do not contemplate the need to resort to legal process. Most
importantly, because legal rules have little effect on family behavior,
a rule enforcing promises would have little effect on the volume of
pronmises made within families. Besides, even if family members
were primarily influenced by legal rules, requiring express
understandings among family members would cheapen the value of
the benefits obtained in the relationship and the relationship itself. 19
Thus, requiring family members to reduce understandings to express,
enforceable agreements would frustrate, rather than promote,
efficient outcomes.
C. An Enforceability Rule Might Generate Costs at the Margins
Of course, there are interdependent familial relationships where
trust is weak and self-interested motives predominate. In such
relationships, the parties might be more likely to consider the
applicable law prior to undertaking particular acts within an
interdependent relationship. At the margins, would an express rule
enforcing implied family understandings increase levels of trust and
beneficial reliance, or would it generate inefficiencies?
It is fair to suppose that a promisee involved in such a
relationship might be more inclined to act in reliance on an implied
rule both in promising and in deciding whether to perform a promise.
318. See id. at 581.
319. See supra Part II.B.
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promise of inheritance if she knew that a court would back her up if
her trust proved misplaced and the family member disinherited her.
On the other hand, that knowledge might encourage an equal
number of promisees in shaky relationships to decrease reliance-type
behavior. If courts presumed that family members who have been
active in the testator's life have reliance-type claims against the
testator's assets, some family members might keep their investment
in other family members to the minimum necessary to convince a
court of the legitimacy of their claim. Those members might
reciprocate only to the extent necessary to prevent legal
disinheritance, even if the potential testator desires more attention or
support, because the potential beneficiary knows that she is likely to
prevail in a will contest so long as she can show she had a functioning
relationship with the testator.
Consider an example. Suppose that mother and her adult son,
who live in the same town, have had a difficult relationship with a
history of mutual disappointments and perceived betrayals of trust.
Mother and son do love one another, and each harbors hope that the
relationship will improve, but neither is likely to trust the other to
provide support in times of need or to keep his or her word. Past
history has taught the two to protect their self-interest when dealing
with one another. Visits between the two are difficult-there are
good moments, but just as often there are misunderstandings and
arguments. For purposes of analysis only, assume it is possible to
attribute a monetary value to the benefits and costs that the mother
and son experience as a result of the visits. Suppose the mother
attaches a value of $500 per month to the son's weekly visits. To the
son, the visits impose a net cost (after subtracting whatever benefit
the son receives from the visits) of $400 per month. Because the
visits are so costly to the son, he has no incentive to visit, even though
the net value of the visits exceeds the costs. In this extreme situation,
the son might be more inclined to visit if he knows that his mother
will "cover his costs" at some point-for example, by leaving her
estate to him. Thus, the prospect of inheritance might generate
efficiency gains.
But suppose the son knows that courts would find and enforce an
implied understanding even if he visited only once a month, instead
of once a week. The self-interested son might then visit only once a
month, incurring a cost of only $100 per month. The mother,
however, might view such infrequent visits as worthless, or worse,
evidence of the son's lack of concern. From an economic perspective,
the son's visits would be inefficient. They would cost the son more
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than they would benefit the mother. Yet a rule that gives the son a
share in his mother's estate as long as he has been moderately
attentive would generate these visits, while a freedom of testation
rule might encourage the son either to make no visits (and incur no
costs) or to make more frequent visits in the hope that his mother
would treat him generously. On these facts, a rule that enforced
implied agreements would be inefficient.3 2
We have no basis for knowing which of these scenarios is more
common at the margins, and, of course, these scenarios do not
exhaust the universe. Because the parties cannot reveal their actual
preferences too precisely without destroying value, courts inevitably
find it difficult to determine the content of an implied understanding;
family members who might seek to use judicial decisions as a guide to
their own behavior will find the task more daunting. Whether
enforcement of implied understandings will generate efficient
reliance is anybody's guess. Moreover, as I have already
demonstrated, any impact the rule would have on behavior would be
marginal at best, since most family members pay no attention to legal
rules in shaping their intrafamilial behavior. Thus, when we analyze
various efficiency arguments on their own terms, we find that the
analysis simply is not helpful for determining the effect that an
enforcement rule would have in the family context.
Explicitly enforcing implied promises would, however, generate
other marginal costs. First, a rule requiring testators to reward
trusting family members might decrease the pleasure testators obtain
from leaving property to those who have been good to them. That is,
a potential testator who believes she is free to disinherit her family
might experience greater pleasure in writing a will that benefits them
than would the testator who feels that the law requires her to do so.
The latter testator cannot make an unequivocal and persuasive
statement that her motivations are altruistic. Second, Eisenberg's
point has some force at the margins-the testator's family members
might lose some of the pleasure that comes with believing that a
testamentary gift is motivated by love or duty.321 Thus, at best, a rule
320. Of course, whatever the legal rule, the son may "over-invest" because he may not
know exactly how much the mother is willing to compensate him for the visits (or, to put
it in layman's terms, he may not know the worth of her estate). For instance, he may
incur visiting costs of say, $600 per month. And if his mother is completely self-
interested, she will not inform her son of his error. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking,
Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71,74-77 (1983).
321. Eisenberg makes this point more generally, arguing against enforceability of
donative transfers. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 847-49.
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expressly recognizing family claims might, at the margins, impede
some efficient outcomes.
In sum, an express rule recognizing implied family
understandings would not encourage trust nor would it promote
efficient behavior in the main. Although such a rule would probably
not generate significant costs, the commodification of familial
relationships might decrease value at the margins. Hence, the
efficiency justification for the prevalent judicial approach to will
contests is tenuous at best.
D. The Law's Supportive Function
If enforcing implied family understandings has little instrumental
effect, what other explanation is there for the judicial inclination to
enforce those understandings? When courts enforce implied familial
understandings at the expense of testator's intent, they mirror and
support well-entrenched social norms.3" The idea that one function
of the law is to support existing social norms is well entrenched in
legal literature. Contract literature is illustrative. Joseph Raz goes so
far as to say that "the predominate purpose of contract law is to
support existing moral practices." 313 Similarly, P.S. Atiyah argues
that judicial decisions reflect changing social beliefs.324  Thus, for
322. As Cardozo stated:
The constant assumption runs throughout the law that the natural and
spontaneous evolutions of habit fix the limits of right and wrong. A slight
extension of custom identifies it with customary morality, the prevailing
standard of right conduct, the mores of the time.... Life casts the molds of
conduct, which will some day become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds,
which have taken form and shape from life.
BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 64 (1921).
323. Raz, supra note 239, at 934. According to Raz, "there is no doubt that the
practice of promising is not a creation of the law. Rather, it is ... rooted in moral
precepts and social conventions." Id. at 916. Thus, it follows that contracts law, "with its
'implied conditions,' formalizes, articulates and gives effect to moral practices." Id. at
932. Raz does not suggest, however, that moral practices are always in accord with moral
principles, and assumes that the validity of the law is determined by the extent to which it
conforms with moral principles, not moral practices. But he does seem to assume that
there is a high degree of overlap between moral principles and moral practices. See id. at
932-34; see also JOSEPH RAZ, The Institutional Nature of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 103, 119-20 (1979) (discussing law's role as a "norm-applying" institution).
324. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 4 (1981) [hereinafter
ATIYAH, PROMISES] (arguing that changing notions regarding the moral foundations of
contract affected the development of the law); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 778-79 (1979) [hereinafter ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL] (arguing




Atiyah, the case law is a window on the social norms of the time.3 zs
Examples abound of the legal system's accommodation of social
norms-even when statutes or common-law rules appear to stand in
the way. In particular, consider the norm that concerns us here:
Parties to trust-based relationships who induce reliance and receive
benefits are morally responsible for those consequences. The law has
often supported and preserved that norm. Consider the history of
the trust. Prior to the early fifteenth century, trusts were not
enforceable in any English court.326 Nevertheless, trust arrangements
(called "uses") were commonplace because they served a variety of
useful functions. 27 In the early fifteenth century, the Court of
Chancery began to enforce beneficiaries' claims against trustees, thus
recognizing and sanctioning pre-existing social practices.3" In 1535,
Parliament explicitly barred the use,329 but people continued to use
trust arrangements despite the unavailability of legal redress.
Because these trust settlors relied on assessments of the trustee's
trustworthiness, they did not contemplate resort to the legal process
to enforce the arrangement.3 When suits were brought to enforce
trust terms, courts enforced them by creatively interpreting the
Statute of Uses to avoid the prohibition on most types of trust
arrangements. 331 Thus, despite a clear statutory prohibition, courts
325. See ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 324, at 779. Atiyah argues that courts
apply social norms and that changes in law represent changes in moral norms.
Specifically, Atiyah's description of evolving contracts law hinges on the historical
movement toward, and then away from, the view of morality as rooted in personal
autonomy. Atiyah argues that as society has moved away from the view of autonomy as
the key to morality, so has the law. Legal principles based on respect for autonomy are
curtailed when competing values become entrenched in the culture as a whole. See, e.g.,
id. at 726-27. Charles Fried also envisions a moral basis for contracts law, although he
views as irrelevant the question whether the correct moral basis accurately reflects
current norms. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2-3 (1981). For Fried, not
only does the law reflect moral principles, but courts have a duty to consider and
implement proper moral principles in deciding cases. See id. at 69-73 (applying certain
moral principles to the question of contract gaps, regardless of whether the correct moral
principles are currently in fashion).
326. See Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 1139, 1145 (1996).
327. See id. at 1143-45.
328. See id. at 1145.
329. See id. at 1145-47.
330. According to Avini, Frances Bacon recognized that a use "'is no more but a
general trust, when a man will trust the conscience of another better than his own estate
and possession; which is an accident or event of human society which hath been and will
be in all laws.'" Id. at 1142 (quoting FRANCIS BACON, READING ON THE STATUTE OF
USES, reprinted in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA 415
(David S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., 1979)).
331. See id. at 1145-47.
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repeatedly recognized an ingrained social practice, not in order to
affect behavior-clearly, people created and would continue to create
trust arrangements regardless of whether the arrangements were
legally enforceable-but so as not to disadvantage those who had
relied in good faith on social norms.
Constructive trust doctrine is another example. Although the
statute of frauds directs that trusts of real property must be in
writing, families often have oral understandings that land shall be
held in trust-like arrangements. 2  Although family members could
easily memorialize their understandings in writing by creating private
express trusts, they do not perceive that such a need exists-they
trust one another.33 Moreover, those who do perceive such a need
might be reluctant to initiate such an action for fear of offending
other family members. When trust proves misplaced, courts could
simply apply the statute of frauds, but doing so would punish family
members who rely on trust. Instead the law enforces these family
agreements by imposing constructive trusts-it performs its
supportive function.3 4 Notably, courts enforce even implicit family
332. For example, a father might transfer title to real property to his daughters with
the understanding that he will continue to treat the property as his own until his death and
that his daughters will reconvey the property to him if he should ever find it necessary.
333. As Cardozo emphasized when imposing a constructive trust on property
transferred by a brother to his sister:
[The grantor] found, as he thought, in the bond of kinship a protection as potent
as any that could be assured to him by covenants of title. It was-"the case of a
confidence induced, not by the bare promise of another, but by the promise and
the confidential relation conjoined." "The absence of a formal writing grew out
of that very confidence and trust, and was occasioned by it."
... It is not the promise only, nor the breach only, but unjust enrichment
under cover of the relation of confidence, which puts the court in motion.
Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1923) (quoting Wood v. Rabe, 96 N.Y. 414, 426
(1884); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 39 N.E. 1067, 1068 (N.Y. 1895)).
334. Cf Raz, supra note 239, at 933-38 (discussing the law's supportive function in the
context of contracts). For example, in Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 255 (N.Y. 1923), Elijah
Purdy, a clerk of the court, transferred his one-seventh share of his father's estate to his
sister, Elvira, who held title to her own one-seventh share. Elijah made the transfer
because his ownership of property had subjected him to constant requests that he go to
bail for those who had been arrested. Later, when Elijah became ill, his niece took him
into her home and cared for him throughout his final illness. In return, Elijah promised to
devise to her his interest in his father's estate. However, Elijah's will gave nothing to his
niece. The jury found that Elijah and his niece had made an enforceable contract, but the
court rejected the niece's claim that Elijah had conveyed the property to Elvira with the
understanding that Elijah continued to have an ownership interest. Instead, the court
directed the jury to find that Elijah had no interest in his father's property, legal or
equitable, to devise. See id. at 256-57. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the
appellate division's affirmance of the trial court's direction, determining that the jury
should have been allowed to decide "whether there had been such an abuse of a
confidential relationship [between Elijah and his sister] as to lead without a writing to the
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trust agreements, with the understanding that the family context
would make an express promise "superfluous."335 The relevant issue
is "what impression was knowingly permitted to exist in the mind of
the [transferor]" by the transferees. 6  Indeed, one court held, in
certain circumstances "'a promise may be implied or inferred from
the very transaction itself' " if the context is an intimate
relationship. 37  Thus, when social norms dictate that family
understandings should be implicit, courts provide redress to those
who abided by those norms only to be disappointed by family
members who failed to reciprocate.3
implication of a trust." Id. at 258; see also Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 808 (N.J. 1947)
(holding that a husband who transferred land to his wife to establish credit for her but
without intent to transfer his property interest was barred from enforcing an express trust
by the statute of frauds, but that the "constructive trust formula" was applicable as a
"remedial device for restoration of the status quo"); Nehls v. Meyer, 95 N.W.2d 780, 782
(Wis. 1959) (reversing a municipal court's order of eviction of the brother by his sister to
whom he had conveyed the subject property because even though "the statute of frauds
-will prevent enforcement of an oral express trust,... in a proper case a constructive trust
will be employed to accomplish justice").
335. Thus, "silence in the presence of conditional assertions may constitute tacit
consent and promise to comply with conditions." Farano v. Stephanelli, 183 N.Y.S.2d 707,
712 (App. Div. 1959). In Farano, the court reversed a trial court's refusal to impose a
constructive trust on the grounds that the father-transferor could not prove that his
transferee daughters expressly agreed to return the transferred property to their father
upon his request. See id. at 714. Noting that the family had enjoyed close and intimate
relationships prior to the dispute, the court stated that "[iln confidential relationships
especially, mutual understanding does not always depend upon words expressly uttered."
Id. at 712.
336. Id.
337. Brand v. Brand, 811 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351
N.E.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. 1976)). In Brand, the court determined that a father's transfer of
the bulk of his assets to joint and co-tenancies with one of two sons was made in reliance
on the son's promise to divide the assets evenly with his brother after the father's death.
See id. at 80. In imposing a constructive trust, the court noted that "an express promise is
not required. 'Even without an express promise,... courts of equity have imposed a
constructive trust upon property transferred in reliance on a confidential relationship
.... '" Id. at 78 (quoting Sharp, 351 N.E.2d at 723).
338. Of course, even a legal system that seeks only to support social norms will have
some marginally instrumental effects. For one, it might cause people to be less concerned
with the law-prior to acting, they need only consult their intuitive sense of moral norms.
See Raz, supra note 239, at 934 (noting that when the law's function is entirely supportive,
then individuals need refer only to social norms, not the law, in planning or calculating
behavior). Thus, those involved in trust-based relationships may continue to rely on
social practices in determining behavior within those relationships and need not worry
that the law will not back them up. Moreover, such a legal system might to some degree
impede the development of other practices that might undermine current norms. See id.
In that sense, it further strengthens people's ability to rely on moral norms rather than the
law prior to acting.
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E. The Construct of Wills Law Resolves the Tension
So we have a conundrum: On one hand, courts are inclined to
enforce implicit promises to avoid punishing those who relied in good
faith on social norms. Yet, a system that expressly recognized claims
of breach of implied promise might be costly at the margins-the
specter of enforcement might cheapen gratuitous promises and
transfers within familial relationships where trust is shaky. The
current structure of wills law, however, provides escape from the
conundrum.33 9
In a will contest, the focus is on the testator's intent: In
formalities cases, "is the proffered document a final, seriously
intended, testamentary expression?" In capacity, undue influence,
and fraud cases, "is the will disinheriting family really reflective of
the testator's intent?"" ° Thus, the family member who contests the
will is spared having to admit that the testator breached her implied
promise to provide for the contestant. Rather, the contestant can
argue that the testator considered disinheritance but did not make a
final decision to disinherit (lack of formalities), or that the testator
would have devised to the family member if she had been in her right
mind (capacity, undue influence) or had not been coerced (undue
influence and fraud). Because we do not conceive of the testator as
having broken a promise, existing doctrine preserves the value of the
relationship and the value of receiving the inheritance-the
contestant receives the estate, not because the court has forced a
disloyal testator to perform, but because the court enables the
testator to do what she would have done if she could speak from the
grave with all her faculties restored. The sanctity of the relationship
is preserved.
339. This structure invokes Dan-Cohen's elaboration of Bentham's theory of conduct
rules and decision rules. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). According to Dan-
Cohen's theory, the law reconciles competing values by organically evolving into a
structure of "conduct rules" and "decision rules." Id. at 625. The general public is aware
of only the conduct rule. See id. at 627. Thus, the "conduct rule" affects and shapes
behavior, see id., but the court may apply an overriding "decision rule" when application
of the conduct rule would work an injustice in a particular case. See id. at 632-35
(discussing the criminal defense of duress as an example of a decision rule). The
"decision rule" is not fully understood by the public at large and thus does not influence
behavior in undesirable ways. See id. at 632.
340. Applying Dan-Cohen's model, the "conduct rule" (the rule of which the public is
aware) is a rule of testamentary freedom (with some limited statutory exceptions). This
rule preserves the cbnception of family understandings as voluntary and motivated by
altruism, which preserves the sanctity of the trust-based relationship and maximizes the
value of the relationship.
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Further, the structure of wills law prevents the general public
from understanding that courts recognize implicit agreements.34'
Because judicial holdings emphasize intent, the enforcement of the
family reciprocity norm is obscured-thus, the dangers of
conceptualizing interactions in family relationships as mirrors of
market transactions are neutralized. At the margins, when self-
interested individuals in families that lack trust might consider the
law prior to acting, the law will not further strip the value from
interactions. Instead, it emphasizes the voluntary nature of the
transactions and obscures self-interested motives.Z
CONCLUSION
In law, the borders between gift and exchange, will and contract,
are fluid rather than clear. Just as courts in contracts cases often
consider the norms of the relationship and the broader culture in
which the relationship sits, so do courts deciding wills cases. In
contracts cases, courts understand that parties engaged in
interdependent, long-term relationships are unable or unwilling to
spell out in advance the legal ramifications of every act that may
occur as the relationship evolves. The higher the level of trust, the
more likely each party is to accept oral assurances and to rely on
implicit representations made by the other. And trust-based
relationships often are the best and most efficient way of maximizing
benefits to both parties and to society as a whole. When one party to
a trust-based relationship benefits from the other party's response to
an implied understanding, courts will enforce the understanding.
The family is a web of interdependent relationships based on
341. Again using Dan-Cohen's model, we can term the phenomenon of courts
enforcing testators' implied promises as the "decision rule." The "decision rule"
recognizes that testators make implied promises to devise and that family members have
a reliance-type claim of enforcement. By overriding the testator's intent when the
testator breached reliance-based obligations, the decision rule ensures that those who rely
on trust-based family relationships are not prejudiced by doing so.
342. Dan-Cohen posits that transmission is obscured through a variety of means-for
example, the decision rule may be too vague to be easily understood, the legal
sophistication of actors may be low, or emotional involvement in the act may be such that
the actor may not deliberate and obtain legal advice prior to acting. See Dan-Cohen,
supra note 339, at 634, 639-43. Here, transmission of the decision rule is obscured by
family members' unwillingness to consult the law prior to interacting with other family
members and the vagueness of the decision rule. Of course, separation is not complete.
For instance, family members do consult attorneys prior to writing wills. Here again,
however, the rhetoric of wills law obscures the decision rule. To the extent that attorneys
do understand it, and they do, they have little incentive to inform a client that her will
might not hold up. Thus, there is some separation between the conduct rule and the
decision rule.
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trust. Family systems are the most fundamental means of providing
the support that individuals need to function, yet the nature of
familial relationships absolutely precludes reducing implicit
arrangements to express agreements. One would expect many
principles of relational contract to be especially applicable in the
family context. Yet, as many scholars have observed, there are few
cases in which family members invoke relational contract principles
to seek recovery from relatives who have defaulted on implied
agreements.
Scholars who have searched in vain for application of relational
contract principles in the family context have been searching in the
wrong place. Because family relationships (other than marriages)
rarely rupture beyond repair before the death of one of the parties, it
is wills law-not contracts law-that best illustrates judicial
application of relational contract principles. And wills law-despite
its Marlboro Man ideology-does not generally permit a testator to
escape from the reciprocally-based expectations he has created in
family members.
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